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Abstract: 
APEC “Member Economies” believe that high-quality comprehensive Regional Trade 
Agreements (RTA) can lead to greater trade and investment liberalization, as well as consumer 
welfare. APEC operates as a cooperative, multilateral, economics and trade forum. 21 “Member 
Economies” emphasized on the importance of “Bogor Goals” of free and open trade and 
investment in the Asia-Pacific region by 2010 in developed and by 2020 in developing countries. 
This thesis aims to shed light on which regional integration practice has the highest impact on the 
economic development of the APEC member countries. Using macroeconomic indicator data 
related to trade from WTO, IMF, UNCTAD and some earlier simulation model analysis was 
used to assess the impact of RTAs among the APEC member and non-member countries. 
Members are engaging RTAs without too much concern over whether they will benefit from that 
arrangement or not. This research showed that trade diversion effect in domestic industry and 
agricultural sector through tariff cut has not been completely offset by increase in consumer 
welfare, investment and trade in the Asia Pacific region. These results can inform future policy 
decisions. The APEC can ensure the sustainable development of member economies; 
establishing common market economy, ensuring free flow of factors of production including 
labor, gradual liberalization policy with transitional period and ensuring full participation in the 
multilateral negotiation in WTO. 
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I. Introduction: 
1.1 Statement of Problem: 
The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) region represents the most 
economically dynamic region in the world. This forum was established in 1989 with the main 
goal to take advantage of the growing interdependence among Asia-Pacific economies, through 
facilitating economic growth to all the member countries. APEC has become successful in 
bringing sustainable development and significant increases in standards of living, over its 19 
years journey, to 21 “Member Economies”, which account for over 40% of the world’s 
population and almost 60% GDP. This forum is committed to reducing tariffs and other non-
tariff barriers of trade across the Asia-Pacific region and enhancing the trade share among the 
member countries. 
After the successful completion of Uruguay Round, countries are entering into regional 
or non regional Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and Partial Free Trade Agreement (PFTA) and 
trying to increase their trade share in the world economy. There are strong views that the RTA 
and FTA will provide WTO plus treatment to the contracting parties and this bilateral 
negotiation will make a broad path to reach multilateral negotiation of WTO. In contrast there is 
a divergent view that the RTA and FTA undermine multilateral negotiations. Jagdish Bhagwati 
states that preferential trading agreements and relationships create enormous complexity in the 
world trading system, which he refers to as the “spaghetti bowl” problem1.  
The empirical evidence states that RTA among APEC countries attracts inflows and 
outflows investment. In 1995, APEC account for US$ 159 billion world outflows (50% of FDI) 
and US$ 171 billion world inflows (54% world inflows)2. The “Bogor Declaration” and “Manila 
Action Plan” integrated its members for trade liberalization, economic and technical cooperation, 
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to reduce the economic disparity among the region (Implications of the APEC process, 91)3. 
Thailand is not only an active member of the WTO, but also one of the founder members of the 
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC). It hosted APEC in 2003 and began an 18 month term as chair of ASEAN in July 2008. 
Thailand has been pursuing a range of bilateral free-trade or similar agreements, and is currently 
involved in negotiations on the Australia-ASEAN-New Zealand FTA (AANZFTA).  
1.2 Purpose of study: 
RTA negotiation has been dramatically increased in the Asia-Pacific region through this 
bilateral trade relation countries are reducing their tariff and non-tariff barriers for goods and 
services, which makes this region more attractive to the investors. The United States, European 
Union, China and Japan are looking towards this economy. By this trade creation both developed 
(Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and USA) and developing (Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, 
China) countries are benefited and total welfare increases. This paper will not cover the whole 
economy of APEC countries only the impacts of Regional Trade Arrangements (RTAs) on their 
trade and economy. Thailand is chosen for empirical study, as it is one of the fastest growing 
economies in the East Asian countries. Moreover this study will work out on whether these 
Regional Trade Arrangements really increase the trade creation, investment and consumer 
welfare of APEC countries, and if so, what is the reason behind this?   
1.3 Research Hypothesis: 
Do these FTA and RTA increase consumer welfare, investment and trade in the Asia 
Pacific region? Do these Regional Trade Arrangements (RTAs) facilitate Thailand to remove 
tariff and non-tariff barriers more than WTO? Do these bilateral negotiations expand the 
economic growth and bargaining capacity of Thailand? Do they have capacity of trade creation 
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more than trade diversion? Do these RTA provide a positive impact for the faster growing export 
in Thailand? Will these Regional Trade Arrangements (RTAs) make a smooth path for 
multilateral negotiation or will they undermine the WTO’s multilateral negotiation? 
1.4 Limitations / delimitations:   
There are various socio-economic activities which formulate the development and 
welfare of a country. This paper has limited its research on trade liberalization and its impact on 
inward and outward investment (FDI) in Thailand. Through RTA negotiation Thailand has 
liberalized its trade policy and reduced tariff and non-tariff barriers that increases the domestic 
market competition, improve the production efficiency and promote consumer welfare. This 
paper will not go through the interview process for primary data collection and research will be 
based on the statistical published data. There is lot of issues regarding Regional Trade 
Arrangements (RTAs) like environmental issues, labor issues but this paper will mostly 
concentrate on the economic impact and welfare economics.   
1.5 Abbreviated explanation of methods: 
My hypothesis will be based on an analysis on the basis of several bilateral treaties of 
Thailand, with other APEC countries, like Japan Thailand Economic Partnership Agreement 
(JTEPA), Thailand Australia Free Trade Agreement (TAFTA) and Thailand New Zealand Closer 
Economic Partnership (TNZCEP) and their impact on the Thai economy. Trade liberalization 
and investment promotion policies of Thailand will be another area of attention. As there is no 
scope to work on primary data, this study will be based on secondary sources of quantitative data, 
such as  Joint Commission Reports, some research papers, statistical data and journal reports, 
rules and regulation of multilateral trade negotiation of WTO, important writings of some 
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dynamic thinkers. Moreover statistical data will be analysis to focus on the impact of these 
treaties.  
1.6 Abbreviated explanation of results: 
Thailand is one of the faster growing countries in South East Asia and it has 39 
Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements with other economies and 33 of them have 
already entered into force. As a result of these RTA there are some trade creation and investment 
which affect the welfare of its economy. Service sectors contribute its 60% of GDP and in some 
sectors it allows 100% foreign ownership. APEC Business Travel Card (ABTC), One Stop 
Service Center for visa and investment and tax remedy attracts FDI in Thailand. Moreover, it 
works as hub a country, as it is member many economic development forum like Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC), Association of South East Asian Nation (ASEAN). Even though 
investment massively increases in industrial and service sector but agricultural sectors growth 
rate is not that much and sometimes exclusion effect in this sector. In all aspect welfare gain of 
Thailand is much higher and increases it bargaining power with the other powerhouse economy.  
1.7 Conclusion: 
After the East Asian economic crisis in 1997, the Thai economy has continued to 
improve well since 2003 despite external uncertainties and shock. Thailand is 25th and 24th 
position in the world exports and imports ranking respectively in the year 2006. The key drivers 
have been the strong performance of export and private consumption. This result makes clear 
conception of increase in consumer welfare and economic development. Thai real GDP growth 
in 2007 was 4.7%, driven mostly by a strong export sector, despite continuing appreciation of the 
baht against the US dollar.  
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Over 1990s Thai FDI increased gradually (except economic crisis in East Asia 1997) but 
investment growth rate fell 1.3% in 2007 (from 3.8% in 2006) and consumption growth rate fell 
to 1.9% (from 3.2% in 2006)4. This reduction is due to the political uncertainty in Thailand since, 
September 2006. Meanwhile investment has rebounded dramatically in Philippines, Singapore, 
which indicates RTA among Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) countries, increases 
their economic growth rate, investment as well as welfare of the economy. The Bank of Thailand, 
the Thai Finance Ministry and the Thai National Economic and Social Development Board have 
estimated that real GDP growth in 2008 will be 4.5% to 5.5%. This statement implies, Thai 
political government has recovered entire situation and from now Thai economy will run 
smoothly. 
Like other South East Asian countries inflation rate fell in Thailand. The Dollar’s 
weakness in the world economy makes imports cheaper and exports expensive, which creates 
growth in fiscal balance (-0.6% of GDP in 2005 and 1.1% of GDP in 2006)5.  Most of the free 
trade agreements signed by APEC countries were notified by Secretariat of WTO, so it reduces 
the possibility of further dispute. Moreover early liberalization will make the country competent 
to compete in the world economy and further multilateral negotiation in WTO.  
This paper is not only theory-based but also an analysis of the statistical data, empirical 
evidence, policy and regulation. Some economic models which were used in the joint 
investigation committee and individual research on the benefit of various treaties will also be 
referred here the paper (APG–Cubed economic model used by Center for International 
Economics). For a better understanding, sector wise, discussion and analysis is required, 
especially the impact on the agricultural sector will not be broadly discussed in this paper. The 
Agricultural sector is still an important sector for Thai economy and impact of RTA of this sector 
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should be analyzed on the basis of proper evidence.  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW: 
2.1. Background 
(a) APEC a New Economic Arena: 
The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) operates as a cooperative, multilateral 
economic and trade forum. It is unique because it represents the only inter-governmental 
grouping in the world committed to reducing trade barriers and increasing investments, without 
requiring its members to enter into legally binding obligations. The forum succeeds by 
promoting dialogue and equal respect for the views of all participants and making decisions 
based on consensus to achieve its free and open trade and investment goals. APEC Member 
Economies take “Individual Action Plans” (IAP) and “Collective Action Plans” (CAP) to open 
their markets and promote economic growth6. The APEC region has consistently been the most 
economically dynamic part of the world since 1989. In the first decade of its birth, APEC 
member economies generated 70% global economic growth, even with the economic crisis in 
East Asia region in 19977. In 19th APEC ministerial meeting leaders of member economies has 
declared their commitment to examine the options and prospects for a Free Trade Area of the 
Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) from the viewpoint of practical and incremental steps8. 
APEC Member Economies are working together to sustain this economic growth through 
a commitment to open trade, investment and economic reform. By progressively reducing tariffs 
and other barriers to trade, Member Economies have become more efficient and their exports 
have expanded dramatically. APEC works in three broad areas to meet the Bogor Goals of free 
and open trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific by 2010, for developed economies, and 2020 
for developing economies, which are known as “APEC's Three Pillars”. These focused areas are: 
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(1) trade and investment liberalization, (2) business facilitation, and (3) economic and technical 
cooperation which enable the Member Economies to strengthen their economies by pooling 
resources within the region and achieving efficiencies. Tangible benefits are also delivered to 
consumers in the APEC region through increased training and employment opportunities, greater 
choices in the marketplace, cheaper goods and services and improved access to international 
markets. 
Moreover, APEC also considers human security, because it is essential for economic 
growth and prosperity of the people of this region. Member economies are committed to work 
voluntarily to protect against natural disasters, transnational terrorism, pandemics, illicit drugs, 
contaminated products, WMD proliferation, infectious diseases, and achieve the food defense 
principle. Through its almost 19 years journey, APEC has been successful in bringing the 
sustainable development and significant increases in standards of living individuals.  
2.2 Theoretical Background: 
(a) Role of APEC 
“The Bogor Declaration” was the turnover point for APEC, because it allowed the 
leaders to agree to a common goal of free and open trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific by 
2010 for industrialized economies, and 2020 for developing economies. “Bogor Declaration” 
became one more step ahead and more specifically an action agenda after the Ministerial 
Meeting in Osaka, Japan, in November 19959. Within the year from 2001 and 2006 business 
transaction costs reduced by 5% and with a further aim to cut by a further 5% by 2010.  
APEC is now working to create an environment to ensure the safe, secured and efficient 
movement of goods, services and people across borders within the region. APEC believes in 
democratic structure, which is reflected in its decision- making procedures, as decisions are 
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taken on the basis of consensus. APEC goals and priorities are set up at the annual meeting. Each 
country has to present an annual planning report about their present structure and future target to 
liberalize their trade policy and reduce their tariff and non-tariff barriers. In APEC actual policy 
decisions are based on consensus and these joint resolutions will be implemented by individual 
governments, with relating their domestic policy formation (Implications 1998, page 51).  
APEC Member Economics strongly believe that, this forum can play the leading role in 
meeting all these above mentioned challenges. This forum will continue its works to achieve its 
goal through removing infrastructure bottlenecks, non-tariff restrictions and restrictions on 
competition in domestic service sectors. Opening the services sectors and capacity facilitates for 
the investment expansion will help to achieve sustainable development. For this reason an 
overwhelming majority of the member countries are engaging in various inter-regional 
agreements such as The Thailand Australia Free Trade Agreement (TAFTA), The Thailand New 
Zealand Closer Economic Partnership (TNCEP), The Singapore US Free Trade Agreement 
(SUFTA), The Australia US Free Trade Agreement (AUFTA), and The China Thailand Free 
Trade Agreement (CTFTA). APEC leader’s dream is to promote further economic integration in 
the Asia-Pacific and to continue it towards a free trade area of the Asia-Pacific in the long run. 
 There is a controversy whether the international or interregional trading system is better 
off with APEC. The answer is very diplomatic, and will depend upon the achievement of “Bogor 
Declarations”. If we analyze the trade flows among its members and with the non-members we 
will find that trade in goods and services is growing faster. Actually the “Manila Action Plan for 
APEC” (MAPA) provides a first glimpse of the map towards the long- term goal set out in Bogor 
(Implications of APEC 1998, page 91). MAPA comprises a set of voluntary and unilateral 
initiatives, as well as collective initiatives on trade and investment liberalization and facilitation. 
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Another important pillar of APEC is not only the liberalization, but liberalization in a process 
that would reduce the economic disparity between the economies in the region. 
  APEC members have been lowering tariffs and non-tariff barriers on the basis of their 
Independent Action Plan (IAP) and Collective Action Plan (CAP). As a result of which average 
(unweighted) tariffs level reduces from 15.4% to 9.1% from 1988 to 1996. In the case of 
Thailand (40.8% to17%) and China (40.3% to 23%) tariff reduces sharply. APEC, as a whole, 
reduces the non-tariff barriers from 9% to 5% during the same period, especially in Australia, 
Chile, New Zealand and Singapore leading the decline in non-tariff barriers in trade 10 
(Implications of APEC, page 93) (Appendix table 1). Actually, the inter-regional free trade 
agreement helps the APEC countries to liberalize their tariff and non-tariff barriers and makes 
them more efficient in the competing economies as well as increase the bargaining power in 
multilateral negotiations. Under comprehensive agricultural trade liberalization global welfare 
gains exceeded $23 billion US dollar in the short run and $37 billion US dollar in the long run. 
These gains accounted for the developing region are $3.3 and $3.5 billion US dollar in short run 
and long run respectively11. 
 The major achievement of Uruguay Round was removal and reduction of subsidies and 
export restraints, like removal of voluntary export restraints and orderly market arrangements by 
1999, removal of domestic support and export subsidies in agriculture, and pushing out quotas on 
textiles and garments sectors. APEC members also reinforced this trade liberalization through 
individual and collective action plans. The Manila Action Plan for APEC (MAPA) mainly 
highlighted on tariff and non-tariff barriers, which has to have liberalization in both sectors 
according to each members’ own effort and Uruguay Round commitments. APEC economies 
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have committed to review existing non-tariff barriers with a view to reducing or eliminating 
those which are not consistent with the WTO measures.  
 2.3. Synthesis of the Other Research:   
(a) Regionalism Versus Multilateralism: New World Regionalism 
In the contemporary world trading system, regional integration arrangements (RTAs) are 
a major force. All most all the members of WTO have already entered into an RTA. In fact, half 
of the international trade takes place within actual or prospective RTAs. RTAs and FTAs are 
now the economic future, so it is necessary to evaluate its impact on the multilateral negotiation 
process. At present the world economy appears to be the process of disintegrating into three 
major trading blocs, The European Union (EU), North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), and 
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) with Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN). These economic blocs have patronage through the four big economies; USA, 
European Union (EU), Japan and emerging China.  
Schott suggest that for successful trading blocs there are four necessary characteristics: 
first geographical proximity second similar level of per capita income third compatible trading 
regimes, and finally political commitment to regional organization (Scott, 1991). In all context, 
the EU exhibits all of the characteristics as its members are in the same geographical proximity, 
per capita income are similar, in addition to members hold a strong political commitment. 
However, the other two blocs do not have all the characteristics. Consequently, disparity among 
the member countries in terms of per capita income and geographical distance among the 
member economies of APEC somehow obstacles for their political commitment.  
In the course of the geographical closeness and strong political commitment, EU become 
much independent and it does not have to depend upon the WTO. As the Free Trade Agreement 
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(FTA) and Customs Unions (CU) internalize market access benefits more directly than a 
multilateral arrangement, member countries need not to rely heavily on WTO procedures. Sapir 
noted that the Hungarian authorities appeared to pay more attention to EU disciplines than 
multilateral disciplines in developing trade policy in early 1990s (Sapir, 1995)12. Due to domino 
regionalism RTA imposes production cost and reduces the welfare on non-member countries. 
Non-member countries have to face higher tariff (not above MFN level) and non-tariff barrier, 
than the member country which enables them to enter into new regional arrangement. 
There is a clear conflict between regionalism and multilateral trade negotiations. There 
are arguments on both sides of debate about whether regionalism encourages multilateralism. 
Regional approach viewers argue that regional arrangement of liberalization makes it easier to 
handle the tough cases. On the contrary, multilateral approach viewers argue that regionalism 
narrow down the theme “substantially all trade” and “other respective regulations on commerce” 
of GATT Article XXIV. Hoekman and Leidy argued that Regional Trade Arrangement (RTA) 
does not cover substantially all trade, agriculture textiles and some other sensitive sector remain 
restricted, and it does not provide to a great extent advance with further liberalization than the 
multilateral system (Hoekman and Leidy 1993). Another version of the argument is that major 
powers might use RTAs to reinforce their own positions in a future multilateral negotiation in 
WTO.   
(b) APEC and RTAs/ FTAs Theme: 
Regional Trade Arrangements (RTAs) and Free Trade Agreement (FTA) has become a 
fundamental issue for APEC countries. Member Economies started their journey in 1989 and 
from that time they setup some mile stones to achieve their sustainable development. APEC 
leaders believe that, RTAs maximized the contribution of these agreements to APEC wide 
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progress towards the Bogor Goals. Ministers agreed that APEC would develop a comprehensive 
model measures on commonly accepted RTA chapters by 2008, which will help them to 
negotiate further economic integration in this area, for trade facilitation and diversification of 
APEC economies13. They agreed with that this would be a valuable contribution to maintaining 
consistency and coherence across RTAs in the region.  
From this point of view APEC Economic Leaders have declared the theme in the 13th 
APEC Ministerial Meeting in Busan, Korea 2005: "Towards One Community: Meet the 
Challenge, Make the Change." They reaffirmed their commitment to achieving trade and 
investment liberalization and facilitation in the APEC region by 2010 and 2020, and resolved to 
continually push it forward in this regard14. 
Beside this, APEC emphasized on the importance of Bogor Goals of free and open trade 
and investment in the Asia-Pacific region, and its proper implementation depend upon the 
individually and collectively commitments. Individual Action Plans (IAPs) and Collective 
Action Planes (CAPs) are two important milestones for reaching the Bogor Goals. In addition, 
investment liberalization is also an important issue for further economic integration. All these 
issues were discussed in several forum of APEC (Tokyo, Japan and Busan, Korea) and on the 
basis of the present need of member economies, Committee on Trade and Investment (CTI) was 
endorsed in 2005 17th APEC Ministerial Meeting. CTI will prepare an annual report focusing on 
IAPs and CAPs, investment, custom procedures, business mobility, standard and conformance, 
private sector development for advancing the trade and investment liberalization and facilitation 
in APEC member economies. APEC Ministerial Meeting will take next plane of action on the 
basis of CTIs’ annual report. 
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I do agree with all the initiatives of APEC for trade and investment liberalization as a 
pathfinder to achieve the dynamic sustainable development and Prosperity. IAPs and CAPs for 
collective investment decisions, economic and technical cooperation are essential for high 
quality RTAs negotiation. This is the prior condition for achieving Bogor Goal. As member 
countries are engaging RTAs without proper calculating the benefit of agreement that creates 
twists among their rules and regulations and drives out the trade creation effects for some 
economy. Consequently to achieve the sustainable development and prosperity in this region 
there need to be collective commitment and acceptable framework for negotiating RTAs.  
(c ). ASEAN Integration and New Dimension: 
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established on 8 August 1967 
in Bangkok by the five original Member Countries, namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore, and Thailand. After accession of Cambodia on 30 April 1999 it becomes 10 members 
association. The purposes of the ASEAN are: to accelerate economic growth, social progress and 
cultural development in the region promote regional peace and stability, and prosperity through 
abiding respect for justice and the rule of law. This economy has contributed $1,100 billion and 
$1,400 billion US dollar in gross domestic product and world trade, respectively, in 2006. The 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASIAN) and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) has close relation in terms of strategic point of view, as out of 21 member economies of 
APEC five are founder members (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) of 
ASEAN.   
This forum fulfilled almost all the basic principles of successful trading blocs: 
geographical proximity, similar level of per capita income, compatible trading regimes and 
political commitment to regional organization. To resolve political differences among the 
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members and other countries ASEAN leaders have negotiated South China Sea Problem, East 
Timor independence, counter-terrorism, regional security issues. It becomes an attractive sector 
of investment, which induced robust GDP growth rate of ASEAN countries in 2007. In 
Cambodia and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, GDP grows by 8.5% and 7.4%, 
consequently15. Geographical closeness of ASEAN countries has expedited its integrity and 
prosperity.       
Recent report shows that ASEAN nations have been unable to attract more FDI. There 
are two competing explanations: one explanation suggests that the deep institutional fragility, 
highlighted by the Asian Crisis, has not since improved measurably and other competing 
explanation argues that investors are interest in China that diverted funds away from ASEAN 
economies. For instance, FDI received in R&D projects in South, East, and South-East Asian 
countries, four fifth of them located in China and India in 2005. The immense Chinese market is 
by means of the stability of the Chinese government, and the willingness of the government to 
develop their economic infrastructure. This infrastructural development, fundamental 
administrative reform induces the firms to invest in China, rather expanding their operations in 
Thailand, Indonesia or other ASEAN countries   (Kwan, 2005 page-35)16. For example Toyota 
established Technical Center Asia Pacific in Thailand in 2005 and it extended its R&D (Research 
& Development) centre in Tianjin, China17. Chantasasawat opposes this kind of positive relation 
between FDI crisis in ASEAN countries and FDI expansion in China. However large numbers of 
investors are investing in China and it drives away the investment in ASEAN and other APEC 
countries in Asia. This inability of ASEAN to attract FDI flows become great concern to the 
ASEAN policymakers. Policymaker realizes that technological transfer, stable capital flows, 
institutional credibility, and human resource development can only ensure potential FDI.  
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 To resolve the crisis of capital flows in ASEAN countries, leaders have focused on real 
integration through RTAs, with the other NICs like Korea, emerging China and India, stable 
economy like Japan, EU, USA, New Zealand, and Australia. From the experience of Asian 
economic crisis in 1997-98 ASEAN policymaker has raised two kinds of awareness. Firstly 
countries needed to strengthen their domestic financial sectors in order to handle the absorption 
of sudden capital crisis and needs to develop the institutional capacity to contain cross-country 
contagion and solve the common financial problems of the countries. Financial integration will 
provide more scope, regional cooperation, and integrations. From 1999-2003 regional integration 
results large share of FDI inflows from China, USA and EU consisted second and Japan consists 
third largest share of FDI. Those countries have skilled human resources and strong institutional 
structural base can influence on that FDI inflows, like Singapore and Malaysia.    
 Regional integration in East Asia has intensified recently, in East Asian that reflects a 
desire to strengthen economic cooperation among the countries after the economic crisis in 
1997/98. ASEAN leaders predicted, this integration may increase the bargaining power in 
multilateral negotiations with the NAFTA and EU blocs. From the ASEAN perspective ASEAN 
Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 1992 was challenging initiative for this region. AFTAs aim is 
lowering the tariff rates to zero by 2010 for ASEAN+6 and by 2015 CLMV. ASEAN has 
recently expanded its regional integration effort through the ASEAN-China FTA, the ASEAN-
Korea FTA, and ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement. These 
bilateral agreements in future could consolidate into an ASEAN+3 wide RTA. A more ambitious 
proposal is to expand ASEAN+3 to Australia, India and New Zealand to form an ASEAN+6 
RTA18. These regional integrations may also offset the welfare gain through trade diversion 
(Viner, 1950). ESCAP simulation for ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+6, suggesting that trade-creation 
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gain outweigh trade-diversion losses19. From this strategic view, it seems that ASEAN wants to 
get benefit as hub economy and resolve their economic uncertainty through cooperation of the 
member countries. 
East Asian trade is characteristically open and global. Table-1 below shows the regional 
countries’ average trade share for the period 2001 to 2003. Even though all East-Asian countries 
have large trade volumes with the EU and the U.S., intraregional trade within ASEAN+3 is 
significant. With China’s rapidly expanding economy still in its early stages, intra-Asian trade 
can be expected to drive the future growth of ASEAN economies. However, much of this intra-
trade is still dependent on final demand in the US and Europe rather than in Asia. Table 1 also 
highlights the lack of substantial intraregional trade within ASEAN countries itself20. 
 
(Cross Country Trade shares 2001-2003) 
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Six founder member of ASEAN are also active members of APEC, and these members’ 
economies are engaging regional and cross-regional partnership. Among them, Singapore and 
Thailand is the most active member. In comparison to other members, Singapore has signed an 
FTA with USA (2004), Japan, Australia, India, Mexico, and negotiating FTA with Canada, 
Korea, and EU. Consequently, Thailand has engaged RTAs with China (2003), New Zealand, 
Australia, Japan and Singapore and enthusiastically negotiating RTAs with EU, USA, India and 
Peru. The main difference between ASEAN and APEC forum is that ASEAN is more 
concentrated economically than APEC from its strategy and mission.    
(d) Role of Japan and USA in the APEC economy: 
 Both Japan and USA has become a big factor in the case of trading blocs in APEC, 
especially in the East Asian bloc and broad-based Pacific Basin Blocs21. With the emergence of 
Japan as a pacific economic power, industrial development of East Asian NICs (Newly 
Industrialized Countries) and also the appearance of sparkling China has totally changed the 
economic climate of Pacific Basin Bloc. Japan has appeared as an RTA bandwagon for the last 
two years. Japan has expanded its economic ties with Asian neighbors like Singapore, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Thailand, Brunei, and ASEAN; it also extended its relation with other South and 
North American APEC countries like Chile, Canada, Mexico and USA. At the same time USA 
also has FTA with Korea, Singapore, Australia and Vietnam. Both Japan and USA are major 
trading partners for all Asian countries in the pacific. Massive trade surpluses for Japan and 
deficits for USA has turned Japan into a creditor and USA into a net debtor which began the 
“US-Japan economic problem” and affect the economic integrity of APEC countries (Jong H. 
Park).  
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 After 1990s Japan has substantially increased its FDA (Foreign Direct Investment) and 
ODA (Official Development Assistant) to the Asian Pacific Countries. For ASEAN countries 
55% of ODA comes from Japan, 11% from US, and 10% from other international organization22. 
Japanese ODA is mostly non-commercial basis, whereas the US has extended its assistant to 
strategically important area like South Korea and Singapore. Through the expansion of Japanese 
aid in the Pacific Asia region will create Japan’s economic collation that excludes USA from this 
region. This conflict and complex relationship between Japan and USA hinders the APECs goal. 
Keause express this complicated relationship between the United Stated and Japan as a 
“contentious marriage”. Mutual presence and collective leadership of USA and Japan in Pacific 
Asian region will strengthen the APEC activities as well as increase the economic share in the 
world economy.  
2.4. Critical Analysis and Conclusion: 
The evidence indicates that the member economies of the APEC countries are engaging 
in excessive regional arrangements with their member and non-member countries, without 
thinking about the positive benefits. The APEC member economies should be focused on the 
quality of a treaty, rather than its quantities. As qualitative treaties increase the trade volume and 
bring the consumer welfare and sustainable development for both member countries, whereas 
less quality treaty undermines partner countries benefits from the treaty. Some of the treaties are 
politically biased, which imposes small economies like, Thailand, Indonesia, and Chile to adopt 
sharp liberalization policies without any transition period. This can be counterproductive to their 
domestic policies. For example the China Thailand Free Trade Agreement (CTFTA) includes 
early harvest program on vegetables and fruits, which derives out the Thai farmers out of their 
domestic market. This sharp liberalization can drastically affect their infant industries and the 
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balance of payment lauding to an unexpected economic crisis like Asian economic crisis in 
1997/98. For instance Kasetsart Universities study on "Thai-Chinese FTA: Impacts of Thai 
Society" showed Thai domestic garlic production has declined sharply due to the low market 
price of Chinese product.    
Borrowing the expression from the Director-General of the WTO, Pascal Lamy, I will 
say, pepper (Regional Trade Agreements) adds taste to your curry (Multilateral Negotiation), but 
too much pepper may make the curry bitter23.  Now it is the time for the APEC countries to think 
about the quality of RTAs, as only the high-quality comprehensive regional trade agreements can 
lead to greater trade and investment liberalization as well as consumer welfare.  
The Committee on Trade and Investment (CTI) of APEC should work rigorously to find 
out the fields of comparative advantages of its member economies and take a collective decision 
for the investment in that respective fields, only in the specialized economies, as it is common 
knowledge, that specialization can bring sustainable development over and above consumer 
welfare. Furthermore “The US-Japan economic problem” due to the trade deficit should come to 
an end and their mutual presence and collective decisions can bring the bigger prospects for the 
APEC economy. To make APEC more active both the power economy should work together 
with the cooperation of other emerging member economies and build strong economic 
integrations through framing a common market like EU. The forum can play additionally an 
active and powerful role in the future multilateral negotiation of WTO.   
For a clear conception of the above mentioned dilemma, I will concentrate on the 
discussion of some Regional Trade Agreements (RTA) of Thailand with APEC some countries 
and also the trade liberalization procedures of Thai economy to analyze the effects of RTAs on 
Thai and other APEC Member Economies in chapter three. Thailand act as a hub country with 
 
 
 21
other stronger economies, like China, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, through various trade 
agreements as a member of both ASEAN and APEC. Closer Economic Partnership helps 
Thailand to liberalize its trade and investment; this makes the Thai economy more capable in the 
world economy, and consequently helps the Thai economy to absolve the economic shock and 
attracts the FDI.  
Additionally, this research will work as a pathfinder to fulfill the commitment of APEC 
and reduce all kinds of disparity among the Member Economies. The statistical data and 
Macroeconomic Model analysis regarding this field will prove its authenticity. Likewise this 
research will also focus on the trade deficit problem between Japan and United States. I will also 
spotlight on how the qualitative RTA changes to the socio economic structure of a country. This 
paper will make the sense to the reader that even though “The North South Dialogue” has not 
been successful, there remains a better opportunity to achieve the sustainable development. 
Active APEC forum will be capable to reduce the inequality among the developed and 
developing countries of North and South region of the world. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 22
CHAPTER 3 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE AND INTER REGIONAL TREATY OF THAILAND: 
3.1 Prospects of Thai Economy 
Thailand is a founder member of The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN, 
1967), Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC, 1989) and also active member in Corns 
Groups of WTO. Thailand hosted APEC in 2003 and began an 18-month term as chair of 
ASEAN in July 2008. Thailand has been pursuing a range of bilateral free-trade or similar 
agreements, and is currently involved in negotiations on the Australia-ASEAN-New Zealand 
FTA (AANZFTA). It has bilateral security and commercial agreements and a long-standing 
defense relationship with the United States. The United States is Thailand's major trading partner 
(15% exports to USA in 2006)24 although Japan is the single largest investor in Thailand. At the 
same time it follows The One China policy, as well as strong trade, investment and labor links 
with Taiwan. Thailand has substantial and growing economic links with Australia, New Zealand 
and European Union, including significant investment. 
(a). Economic condition 
Thailand's real GDP growth in 2007 was 4.7% driven mostly by a strong export sector, 
despite continuing appreciation of the baht against the US dollar. The Bank of Thailand, the Thai 
Finance Ministry and the Thai National Economic and Social Development Board have 
estimated that real GDP growth in 2008 will be 4.5% to 5.5%. Annual headline inflation as of 
July 2008 was 9.2%. Foreign Direct Investment in Thailand has increased gradually due to its 
trade policy liberalization and several incentive packages to investors, specifically in the service 
sectors. In 2006 total FDI was 68,058 million US$ which is 33% of its GDP and it is the second 
largest FDI flows among South-East Asian countries after Singapore25.  
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(b). Measures for Investment flows: 
For strengthening investment relations with other countries, Thailand continuously 
pursues efforts in concluding Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements. Thailand has 
signed 39 Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements with other economies and 33 of 
them have already entered into force. Thailand is also a contracting party to the framework on 
ASEAN Investment Area Agreement. Among APEC members, Thailand has Agreements for the 
Promotion and Protection of Investments with Canada, China, Chinese Taipei, Indonesia, Peru, 
Philippines, South Korea, Vietnam, ASEAN and Russia.  
Thailand has implemented The ASEAN Harmonized Tariff Nomenclature in accordance 
with Harmonized System (HS) 2007 since January 2007. It is also providing Intellectual Property 
Rights (IPR), risk management for trading system, E-Customs systems (Paperless) for the 
Express Consignment Clearance categories 4 in 2007. In terms of transparency, the Office 
Bureau of Investment (BOI) has improved its website and information of investment in Thailand 
is available in 6 languages (Thai, English, French, Japanese, German and Chinese). 
  Thailand has been efficient in issuing APEC Business Travel Cards (ABTC) to Thai 
business persons since 2002 with the collaboration of The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
Joint Standing Committee on Industry, Commerce and Banking. By November it has already 
issued over 1300 ABTCs. The Thai government has been providing “One-Stop Service Center” 
for Visas and Work Permits since 1997 and now authority has extended to provide this facility 
within 3 hours that represents strong administrative reform in Thailand. 
The Thai Government has developed procurement website which contains information 
such as procurement opportunities, contracts awarded, and blacklists of suppliers, which 
improves the transparency of the government. It has also developed websites for e-Commerce 
 
 
 24
entrepreneurs, e-revenue web services and websites for their businesses and promoted export 
software for entrepreneurs, which provide automatic information sharing service with the 
stakeholders using web services technology26.  
The government Thailand has introduced “The Foreign Business Act B.E. 2542 (1999)” 
which replaces the Alien Business Law of 1972 and it has come into force March 2000. The 
Infrastructure in some rural areas of Thailand is not well developed. To promote decentralization 
of industrial activities from Bangkok, The Office Bureau of Investment (BOI) has divided the 
country into three Zones based on economic factors and the Thai government, and then has to 
encourage the investors to locate in these areas by providing them special incentives. The Bank 
of Thailand has considerably liberalized capital transfer of foreign investors. Foreign investors 
can bring in capital to invest in Thailand without any restrictions. 
Thailand has adopted dispute settlement mechanism, as embodied in the Bilateral 
Investment Treaties (BITs) with other economies including ASEAN Investment Area Agreement. 
Thailand has allowed international arbitration as a dispute settlement mechanism, including in 
many instances accordance with the International Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Dispute between States and Nationals of other States. (ICSID Convention) in addition it allows 
to traditional local remedy under the judicial system27. 
3.2 Thailand Australia Free Trade Agreement: 
Introduction 
Australia and Thailand successfully concluded negotiations on a free trade agreement 
(FTA) in October 2003. The Australia–Thailand Free Trade Agreement (TAFTA) is Australia’s 
third FTA, while it is Thailand’s first comprehensive FTA first with a developed country. This 
FTA between Australia and Thailand represents a continuation of previous efforts, as both 
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countries are negotiating towards more open and regulated economies. From the global 
economic perspective, Thailand has become an important issue for Australian goods and services. 
Thailand-Australia Free Trade Agreement (TAFTA) entered into force on 1 January 2005. 
Through this FTA, opportunities are also opening in Thailand for Australian service providers, 
investors, and manufacturers.  
(a) Historical background: 
The chronological relationship between Australian and Thai government compelled them 
to negotiate for deeper economic and development relationship. The two Prime Ministers John 
Howard and Thaksin Sinawatra, announced the deal on 19th October, 2003 after more than a year 
of negotiations. The Agreement was formally signed by the two countries on 5th July 2004 and 
come into force on January 2005. From its formation this agreement is a WTO plus agreement, 
as both countries committed liberalization of trade and services more than MFN tariff base. The 
parties notified the TAFTA on goods and services under GATT Article V: 7(a) and GATS 
Article V: 7(a) respectively on 5th January 200528. 
This agreement will deliver a new investment opportunities and an improved climate for 
commercial exchanges for both the partner countries. Thailand and Australia both is active 
member of APEC. Both countries are committed to achieve Bogor Goal. Given the recent 
uncertainty surrounding future rounds of the WTO, we are not in a position to speculate about 
further trade liberalization on a MFN basis. The APEC liberalizations announced under the 
Bogor Declaration are voluntary and do not have the legal force that MFN tariff reductions have 
as agreed and signed under the Uruguay Round of the GATT.  
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(b) Feasibility Study by Center for International Economics 
 The Australian Centre for International Economics use APG-Cubed economic model to 
analyze the implications of this agreement, where change in real consumption is used as the 
primary indicator of the consumer welfare. Thailand is anticipated to experience greater gains 
from the Agreement than Australia. According to this analysis, Thai economy has to reduce to a 
great extent of tariff and non-tariff barriers. This expectation is reinforcing exports, imports and 
investors to invest in Thailand. 
The macroeconomic implications of the Agreement for Australia implies that real GDP 
rises above the baseline with the Agreement and peaks in 2011 at just under 0.03%. Over the 
entire period of 2004 to 2025, real GDP is more than 0.01% which rise in real consumption is 
slightly greater in 2012 (0.04%). The largest absolute increase in production occurs in the non-
durable manufacturing sector, whereas the durable manufacturing sector and services sector 
experiences the second and third largest absolute increases in production, respectively. The 
lowering of Australian trade barriers is associated with more efficient domestic industries, while 
the lowering of Thailand’s trade barriers enables Australian producer’s greater access to Thai 
markets. (Annex 2 figure1)    
Australian Sectoral result 
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Benefit for this FTA will be much greater for Thailand than those for Australia. 
Thailand’s real GDP is 0.16% higher than would otherwise be the case in 2005 and 0.45% higher 
than the baseline in 2020. Real consumption also increases by 0.85% in 2020. The primary 
reason for this difference is that Thailand starts from a base of higher barriers to trade than 
Australia which creates larger reductions to trade barriers. TAFTA will result the largest change 
in service sector of Thailand both in absolute and relative terms. Most interesting is that the 
change in the production of agricultural sectors is very nominal around 0.23% in 2025, although 
agriculture is the second most distorted sector due to trade liberalization. In fact, consumption of 
agricultural products will increase as tariff cuts reduce the price level.     
Thai sectoral Result: 
 
Welfare and production gains from the Agreement: 
Through this Agreement Thailand and Australia could make gains to real welfare 
(consumption) of nearly 4.6 billion US$ and 1.6 billion US$ respectively. In terms of real GDP, 
the gains are 6.8 billion US$ and 2.4 billion US$ consequently. The gains to Thailand are around 
three times the gains for Australia. As explained earlier, the gains are greatest to Thailand 
principally because they are reducing more distortions to their economy (barriers to trade) than 
Australia. Australia is a relatively open economy.  
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Welfare and Production gain form the agreement: 
 
(C) Liberalization Commitment:  
 The enforcement date of the Agreement Australia eliminates tariff on 83% of total tariff 
lines for products of Thai origin. It includes fresh fruit and vegetables, processed foods, small 
passenger vehicles, etc. By 2010, a further 13% of tariff lines will be duty-free which includes 
plastics, rubber, and rubber products. Finally, by 2015 all tariff line will be duty-free for products 
of Thai origin. Consequently, Thailand liberalized its duties on Australian goods for 49% of its 
tariff lines, which is corresponding to 79% of Thai imports from Australia (2002-2004). By 2015 
more 45% tariff line will be liberalized, which includes textiles, base metals, and beverages. 
TAFTA provides that Thailand can apply tariff-rate quotas (TRQ) on 23 agricultural products 
imported from Australia, on 18 products tariff elimination scheduled for 2020 and remaining five 
sensitive products elimination deadline is by 202529.   
(D) General and Special Provision of TAFTA: 
(1) Positive list approach:  
The TAFTA agreement has a "positive list approach" for goods and services and covers 
Chapters 1-97 of the Harmonized System (HS). This means that it only includes those sectors 
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and areas of regulation which each government agrees to list in the agreement. This structure is 
an improvement on the "negative list" approach, which includes all services unless they are listed 
as exceptions, and which places much greater limits on the ability of governments to regulate 
goods and services. 
(2) Standstill Clause: 
The parties cannot increase existing, or introduce new customs duties on imports of an 
originating good (Article 203.2 of TAFTA). In case of non-tariff measures, the parties are not 
allowed to adopt or maintain any prohibition or restriction on the imports of any goods of the 
other party or on the export or sale for export of any good destined for the territory of the other, 
except in accordance with Article XI of GATT 1994 and of creating unnecessary obstacles to 
trade between the Parties (Article 209). These clauses of the Agreement are act as a “Standstill 
Clause”30. It is just like an undertaking from both the parties to prevent them from a disorderly 
movement in tariffs and other restrictions. 
(3) Progressive Trade elimination: 
Trade liberalization takes place on the basis of a positive list approach, and covers 1-97 
of the Harmonized System (HS). Through this progressive elimination indicates customs duties 
on originating goods are taking place based on the various stages listed in the parties’ tariff 
schedule (Annex 2 of the Agreement). Tariff reduction takes place on 1st January of each given 
year. It is a very pragmatic clause of the Agreement that the elimination of customs duties may 
be accelerated unilaterally or through consultation of both parties. 
(4) Development friendly developing countries: 
In case of Rules of Origin, this Agreement follows the RVC (Regional Value Content) 
and CTC (Change in Tariff Classification) jointly or RVC alone for non-originating materials. 
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According to this Agreement from Chapter 50-64 minimum RVC is 55%. One of the special 
provisions of this Agreement is that the value of non-originating materials produced in 
developing countries may contribute towards the RVC for those goods up to a maximum 
allowable proportion of 25% of the FOB value of the goods. This provision is to expire 20 years 
after the force of the Agreement. So this treaty helping for the development of some listed 
developing countries. (Article 403.2 and Annex 4.1)31. 
(5) Safeguard Mechanisms: 
Chapter 5 of TAFTA describes the safeguard mechanism of the parties. Part II of this 
Chapter provides for traditional safeguard measures, provisional safeguard measures and global 
safeguard measures. Part III provides for special safeguard measures for certain sensitive 
products. The most important safeguard for this Agreement is the Special Safeguard Measures 
(SSG). According to this SSGs 41 Thai and 5 Australian agricultural tariff items are listed in 
Annex 5 of the Agreement. Imports beyond a predetermined annual trigger level (increased by 
5% every year) for any given year may be changed with the current MFN tariff rate or the base 
rate, whichever is lower, in lieu of the preferential rate. The SSG regime will be reviewed within 
three years of the entry into force of the Agreement (Article 509 of TAFTA). 
(E) Investment and Trade in Services: 
The service sector is extremely influential sector for both parties’ economies as it 
accounts for 70% of Australia’s and 60% of Thai GDP. Australia has ranked 12th in terms of 
both world imports and exports of commercial services in 2005. Its outward direct investment is 
more significant in terms of its share of total investment, as it stands for 33% of total investment, 
while inward direct investment is 24% of total inward investment. in contrast Thailand ranked 
28th in terms of world exports of commercial services. Thailand received almost double inward 
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investment than what it invested abroad for the year 2005, total inward and outward investment 
are 137 billion and 79 billion US$ respectively.        
The pattern of investment differs widely between the two countries. Several years early 
Thai investment in Australia was much higher than Australian investment in Thailand, but 
Australian investment stock in Thailand has increased constantly. In 2005 it was 0.7 billion US$, 
which was 452% more than in 2001. Australian direct investment in Thailand has raised over 
seven fold between 2001 and 2004 (0.23 billion US$). From the total investment exchange 
perspective of both countries investment exchanges are very small. Australia and Thailand 
attracts just 0.14% and 0.13% of its total direct outward investment stocks, respectively32.  
Australia has completely opened its border for service sector. So Thai legal services, 
computer related services, mining consultancy services, satellite and mobile communication 
services, environmental services and training services based on Thai culture have spread in 
Australia. Through the Agreement Thailand committed to liberalize eight sectors out of eleven 
service sectors and excluded sectors are environmental, financial and health and social services, 
whereas Australia listed to liberalize all eleven sectors. Both commitment schedule have two 
sectors one is horizontal (Commercial presence and presence of natural persons) and other is 
sector-specific commitments. Before FTA Thailand maintained 49% on foreign equity 
involvement in respect of all services, and in some services rules and regulations was much more 
restricted. Now Thai government allows 100% Australian ownership in general management 
consulting services, construction services and 60% ownership in mining, restaurants and hotel, 
service related with tourism travel and recreational, maritime transport services, and educational 
services33. 
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(F)Reasons for Agreement: 
Economically, it is anticipated that TAFTA would increase Thailand and Australian GDP 
by 46 billion and 12 billion US$ respectively over 20 years. The two countries enter into this 
Agreement to take the share of this growth. Strategically, this FTA allows the market in 
Australia to enter into one of the best promoting economies in the East Asian region. This will 
facilitate both countries to step towards more liberalized trade with other ASEAN countries. 
From Thailand’s perspective FTA represents the symbol of commitment to open up its markets 
to more competition and other ASEAN countries to do the same.  
Moreover, in cases of service sectors like architecture and engineering services, 
physiotherapy training, education and training, Bangkok will be act as a hub to Vietnam, Laos, 
and Cambodia. To share this gains 3.66% Australian business and convention visitors are 
investing in Thailand, and this rate is increasing tremendously. The Thai government is 
liberalizing its trade policy through this FTA, so it makes easy access of the Australian service 
sector in Thai market and expands this service throughout the ASEAN countries.  
(G) Impact of TAFTA: 
TAFTA is a major market opening agreement. It will lead to the complete elimination of 
Thailand's significant tariffs across all sectors and substantially improve the environment for 
services trade and investment. It also improves and promotes increased business mobility 
between Australia and Thailand. There are also significant improvements in access for 
Australian services exporters and investors in the Thai market. Thailand has relaxed a number of 
its restrictive conditions relating to visas and work permits for Australian business people and 
has guaranteed non-discriminatory treatment of Australian investments in Thailand. More than 
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870 Australian companies have been registered as active exporters under TAFTA and more than 
14,000 certificates of origin for shipments to Thailand have been issued. 
Merchandise trade between two countries has increased considerably from 6.8 billion 
US$ in 2004 to 12.3 billion US$ in 2007. Australia's main export items to Thailand are crude 
petroleum, aluminum, non-monetary gold, copper and coal. In contrast Thailand's key exports to 
Australia are motor vehicles (light commercial and passenger), non-monetary gold and heating 
and cooling equipment. Service sectors also benefited from this agreement. Australia's services 
exports to Thailand in total 804 million US$, while services imports is 1.6 billion US$ in total 
2007, which makes Thailand as 9th largest services trade partner and 13th largest services export 
market of Australia 34 . Thailand mainly exports recreational travel services and transport, 
including shipping to Australia. Thailand is currently examining the potential to increase services 
trade with Australia in health-related services, including alternative medicine therapy, education 
services, and exports of construction and related professional services.  
TAFTA substantially improves the environment for bilateral investment. Thai investment 
in Australia is 328 million US$ in 2007, which is 12.3% increase in investment relative to the 
year 2006. While Australian investment in Thailand is 1,398 million US$ in 2007, which is 
29.2% increase in relative to the year 200635. TAFTA also includes mechanisms aimed at 
promoting cooperation, transparency and international best practice in a wide range of areas such 
as intellectual property rights, competition policy, e-commerce, quarantine standards and 
industrial standards. 
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3.3 Thailand and New Zealand Closer Economic Partnership: 
Today’s world is the world of global finance and economic cooperation. After successful 
completion of Uruguay Round, countries are engaging themselves into regional or non-regional 
FTA and PTA and trying to increase their trade share in the world economy. According to 
WTO’s Secretariat report 380 FTA has notified by 2007, it will exceed 400 by the end of the 
year 2010. FTA negotiation has increased in the Asia Pacific region, Closer Economic 
Partnership (CEP) between Thailand and New Zealand is one of the influential FTA among these. 
This Agreement was signed on 19th April 2005 and entered into force on 1st July 2005. Thailand 
New Zealand Closer Economic Partnership (TNZCEP) Agreement was notified under Article 
XXIV: 7(a) of the GATT 1994 on 1st December 2005. This comprehensive trade facilitated 
between the two countries will provide real benefits for the people, business and economics of 
both nations as well as help to advance the APEC and WTO trade liberalization process. 
(a) Historical Background: 
Thailand and New Zealand both are active members of APEC. Both countries are 
committed to achieve “The Bogor Goals” of APEC to make free and open trade by 2020. The 
Prime Ministers of Thailand and New Zealand agreed to establish a Closer Economic Partnership 
(CEP) at the APEC leaders meeting in Bangkok, October 2003. For this purpose they also agreed 
to undertake a joint study to investigate the benefit of CEP. 
Join Investigation Committee (JIC) has investigated both countries strategic points and 
submitted their reports April 2004. Both countries are member of “Cairns Group” of agricultural 
product exporting countries in WTO and presenting a common platform in the agriculture 
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negotiations in WTO. Thailand mainly exports manufactured products and agricultural product 
and New Zealand mainly export dairy products and meat. New Zealand’s import from Thailand 
is 0.3 billion US$ which are only .016% of its global import (18.6 billion US$). Meanwhile 
Thailand’s import from Zealand is 0.2 billion US$ which are only .0026% of its global import 
(75.8 billion US$) 36. So their inter-country trade flows are very nominal, in comparison to their 
international trade flows.  
Thailand has expertise in automotive, electrical machinery and textile clothing; 
meanwhile New Zealand has also comparative advantage in dairy product, meat, fruit and 
vegetables. New Zealand’s dairy product and fruit and vegetable have significant demand in the 
Thai market for its high quality. But exporters are facing quota (55,000 tone quotas for dairy 
product) and high tariff barriers that reduces their trade gain (40% face tariff for fruit and 
vegetables)37. Reduction of tariff and non-tariff barrier under Thailand New Zealand Closer 
Economic Partnership (TNZCEP) will lead to increase welfare due to price reduction, trade 
creation between these two countries which will create strategic and dynamic gain in the long 
run. NZCEP Agreement was signed on 19th April 2005 and entered into force on 1st July 2005.  
(b) Trade Liberalization: 
 Tariff and other duties will be liberalized phase by phase through this agreement.  
Elimination of tariffs and non-tariff barriers and to establish free trade area maximum periods up 
to 20 years for Thailand and 10 years for New Zealand. Tariff reduction will take place on 
January 1st of each given year and customs duties will be accelerated unilaterally or by the 
request of either party. Tariff elimination will be on the basis of TNZCEP schedules and in terms 
of the number of affected tariff lines.  From the enforcement date 82% of New Zealand’s total 
tariff lines are free for Thai origin products and it will to increase 9% by 2010. In the case of 
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Thailand 51% total tariff lines are free for New Zealand origin product; the remaining 45% will 
be covered by 202538. 
  (c) Special Regulations and Provisions: 
  (1) Safeguards and remedies: Under the CEP, both parties will retain their existing 
WTO rights and obligations on anti-dumping and countervailing duties procedures and use the 
global safeguard measures. Bilateral safeguards include transitional and provisional safeguard 
measures. Due to tariff reduction, if one parties increased export causes serious injury to other 
countries domestic industry (like or directly competitive good), transitional safeguard allows 
suspension of tariff concession and compensation through investigation of competent authorities. 
Provisional safeguard measures for “highly unusual and critical circumstances”, where there are 
clear evidences that increased import causes serious injury; additional duties can be collected and 
will be refunded if injury is not found. Thailand can apply Special Safeguards measures for 41 
sensitive agricultural products during transition period lasting until 2015 or 202039.  
 (2) Duty Drawback: This Agreement follows the general rules to duty drawback, which 
means duties/ tariffs on imported materials of Thailand are refunded or reduced when the 
materials are processed in New Zealand and subsequently final product is exported to Thailand, 
provided that final good is exported within one year from the date of import of raw materials and 
vice versa. 
 (3) Treaty of Waitangi: TNZCEP Agreement contains a special provision whereby New 
Zealand maintains the rights to take measures including in fulfillment of its obligations under the 
“Treaty of Waitangi” and it is excluded from the dispute settlement provision40.  
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 (4) Self Certification: Preferential treatment is granted not on the basis of certificate of 
origin but rather on a declaration of origin and such declaration is “Self Certification” which is 
made on the face of the invoice with other supporting document by exporter, producer. 
 (d) Reasons of Agreement: 
 Thailand is an excellent hub for business operations in South East Asia and it provides a 
cost effective option and business friendly environment for New Zealand and other international 
companies. This Closer Economic Partnership reflects the longstanding friendship between 
Thailand and New Zealand and recognition of the gains that would potentially accrue to both 
Thailand and New Zealand. This arrangement involves not only preferential liberalization of 
trade in goods but also a range of other issues which will extend and deepen ties across the wider 
trade and investment relationship. Global connection and cooperation is very crucial for success 
in today’s international market, especially it is for the small economy which is heavily depend on 
international trade. As Thailand is also a member of ASEAN country it will helpful for New 
Zealand to enter into the ASEAN market. Both countries trade policies recognize that strategic 
bilateral partnerships asset companies and business to compete in the third country markets 
through cooperation in exchange ideas, production and marketing, and access to competitively 
priced inputs.    
 Moreover in case of service sector like architecture and engineering services, 
physiotherapy training, education and training, Bangkok will be act as a hub to Vietnam, Laos, 
and Cambodia. The broad aim of CEP agreement would facilitate to the trade in services 
between Thailand and New Zealand. Thai government has currently liberalized its trade policy 
and further liberalization in Foreign Business Act, Financial Reporting Act 1993 and Companies 
 
 
 38
Act 1993 and Immigration Act 1987 will reduce the non-tariff barriers and boost up Thai New 
Zealand companies cross border operations41. 
Thailand has maintained some of the highest trade barriers in the South East Asia region. 
Tariffs on New Zealand products average nine percent and for many goods are as high as 40% to 
60%. By removing all these tariff and non-tariff barriers over time the CEP will open up 
significant opportunities for New Zealand and Thailand to develop their trading relationship to 
full potential. Without this agreement, New Zealand would be significantly disadvantaged in the 
Thai market due to the preferential entry given to Thailand’s current FTA partners, China, 
Australia and ASEAN member countries, and future partners including the United States and 
Japan. 
 For the “open regionalism” principle of the ASEAN Economic Ministers (AEM) has 
close relation with Australia and New Zealand. To linkage ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) 
and Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Regional Trade Agreement (ANZCERTA), AFTA-
CER was established. Consequently ASEAN Economic Ministers and CER Ministers have 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding on standards and conformance in November 1996. This 
bilateral negotiation will strengthen the previous relationship between Thailand and New 
Zealand42. 
 (e) Economic Effect of TNZCEP:  
 Through early trade liberalization, TNZCEP will provide time New Zealand and Thai 
producers to adjust, become more efficient and therefore be in competitive positions in the world 
economy and take strong steps on future APEC and multilateral liberalization. TNZCEP will 
bring welfare for the producers and consumers of both countries by liberalizing the trade barriers 
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gradually. According to the comparative advantage theory of Adam Smith this RTA will make 
trade creation and reduce relative price of product and deadweight loss. 
 Global connection and cooperation are crucial for success in today’s international market 
place. This strategic partnership will assist companies and business man to compete in the third 
country markets through cooperation in exchanging ideas, production and marketing. TNZCEP 
can bring economic gains through improvement of trade condition and technical cooperation. 
Due to strong economic relationship and faster growing economy of Thailand many big 
company of New Zealand increases their investment in Thailand. Thailand and New Zealand 
chamber of commerce has a membership of around 100 companies. Trademark registration 
dramatically increases in Thailand and out of seventeen thousand two hundred twelve trademarks 
six thousand one hundred ninety four are registered by non-resident. Moreover partnership and 
property of non-resident ownership sharply increases, out of 553 industrial properties 491 are 
owned by non-resident partner43.    
  Thailand is a leader in the economic reform and trade liberalization in ASEAN. From 
economic and geopolitical point of view Thailand became important and as a result of which, 
FDI increases dramatically. In Thailand FDI was 68,058 million US$ in 2006 which is 33% of 
its GDP and in 1990-1995 it was only 10.7% of its GDP. In South-East Asian countries 
Thailand become the second largest FDI receiver44. Through this CEP New Zealand wants to 
take the share of this trade creation and Thailand wants material and technological support from 
advanced country. 
  This will enhance welfare for the consumers and producers improve opportunities for the 
exporters of both countries. Thai share in the merchandise trade both in import (61,923 million 
US$ in 2000 and 125,975 million US$ in 2006) and export (68,963 million US$ in 2000 and 
 
 
 40
128,220 million US$ in 2006) sectors has increased after two years of the enforcement of this 
treaty. New Zealand’s increase in merchandise trade is almost double both in import (13,905 
million US$ in 2000 and 26,477 million US$ in 2006) and export (13,297 million US$ in 2000 
and 22,343 million US$ in 2006)45. This treaty stimulates economic activities and attracts FDI 
which in turn increase production efficiency as well as their world trade partnership.  
   The Thai government has committed to maintain access for 100% equity participation 
and to not restrict the number of New Zealand investment directors for investments in a number 
of manufacturing sectors including machinery and mechanical appliances, food processing, 
paper products, software manufacture, furniture and textile manufacture. Future services 
negotiations will provide an opportunity to seek improved access for investment in other 
sectors.46  
3.4 Japan Thailand Economic Partnership Agreement: 
             Introduction 
 Japan and Thailand Economic Partnership Agreement (JTEPA) was signed on April 3rd 
2007 and come into force on November 1st 200747, after four years of negotiation starting from 
December 11, 2003. It is a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) in goods, notified to the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) under the GATT XXIV, and in services under the GATS V. As is 
generally known, Japan is the world’s second largest economy, while Thailand is a developing 
country. There is an asymmetric economic relationship and strategic view of Japan and Thailand 
to enter into this agreement. According to Japan statistics in 2002, trade between Thailand and 
Japan was JPY 2.85 trillion. For Thailand, Japan has been the largest trade partner, and for Japan, 
Thailand ranks the 8th largest trade partner. Japan Trade Statistics shows that in 200148.  The 
JTEPA is aiming to further enhance and deepen the Thai-Japan strategic partnership in wide 
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range of areas concerned, so as to develop not only a simple FTA but more comprehensive 
relations for the better future between the two countries. 
(a) Historical background: 
Thailand and Japan have extremely sound relationship from the view point of diplomatic 
and business perspectives. During his official visit to Japan in November 2001, the Thai Prime 
Minister, H.E. Dr. Thaksin Shinawatra, proposed to Japanese Prime Minister, H.E. Mr. Junichiro 
Koizumi, that Thailand and Japan should explore together the possibility of establishing a 
bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA). The Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi proposed the 
“Initiative for Japan-ASEAN Comprehensive Economic Partnership” in January 2002 at the time 
of his visit to five ASEAN countries; and the Thai Prime Minister Thaksin gave his full support 
on that regard, that made their relationship much deeper. After the long term conversation and 
discussion of working group and Tusk Force JTEP was signed on April 3rd 2007 and come into 
force on November 1st 2007. 
Japan's main export goods are cars, electronic devices and computers. The most 
important single trade partner is the USA which imports more than one quarter of all Japanese 
exports. Other major export countries are Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea, China and 
Singapore. Japan has a large surplus in its export and import balance. The most important import 
goods are raw materials, such as oil, foodstuffs, and wood. The major suppliers are the USA, 
China, Indonesia, South Korea, and Australia. Japan is the world largest importer net importer of 
agricultural product. Meanwhile Thailand has a comparative advantage processing food, sea-
food, machineries, medical service, massage service, elderly care services, child care services, 
and home helper services. This bilateral relation will help both countries to liberalize their goods 
and service sectors by reducing their tariff and nontariff barriers. 
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(b) Reasons of Agreement: 
 Politically, the strategic linkage with South East Asian region may ring true when it 
comes to Japan’s FTA strategy with Thailand. Japan’s continued presence in ASEAN would 
sustain its power in the region and East Asia49, vis-à-vis other big states such as the USA and 
China. Thailand’s economy and membership in ASEAN may be the indication that having the 
FTA with Thailand would further foster Japan’s strategy goal. Meanwhile Thailand would prefer 
to strengthen the existing long-term relation with Japan50.  
Japan has been very active in providing foreign aid51 in many forms to Thailand for the 
country’s economic development and in time of crisis. Thus, it makes sense for Thailand to seek 
the FTA with Japan, despite having a low bargaining power, since the concluded FTA would not 
only deepen the existing bilateral cooperation with Japan but also maintain Thailand’s status quo 
in the region, when Japan was also negotiating an FTA with Indonesia. 
 Economically, the FTA could be beneficial to both nations since Thailand is also an 
important trading nation. In 2006, Japan’s exports were valued at 647,006 million US$ and 
imports were 579,593 million US$, accounting for 5.34% of the world total exports and 4.66% 
of the world total imports, respectively. Meanwhile, Thailand exported about 1.08% of the world 
total exports and imported about 1.05% of the world total imports. Moreover, Japan ranked 3rd as 
Thailand’s export destination, and 1st as Thailand’s import origin in 2006. The export and import 
volumes between Thailand and Japan were not balanced. Japan’s exports to Thailand represented 
20.28 billion US$ in 2004, 22.5 billion US$ in 2005 and 20.1 billion US$ in 2006, but imports 
from Thailand accounted for 14.11 billion US$ in 2004, 15.6 billion US$ in 2005, and 12.7 
billion US$ in 200652. That both countries had trade surpluses but unbalanced inter-trade allows 
for the possibility for the expansion of their trading potentials with each other. 
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 Specifically, Japan and Thailand could increase their trade in terms of products and lower 
tariffs conceded under the FTA. Thai major exports include “textiles and footwear, fishery 
products, rice, jewelry, automobiles, rubber and computers”, and major imports are “capital 
goods, intermediate goods and raw materials, fuels and consumer goods”. Japanese major 
exports are “cars, electronic devices, and computers” and her major imports consist of “oil, 
foodstuffs and wood”53. In 2002, Thailand exported mostly manufacture accessories and parts to 
Japan duty-free, and only some agricultural produce at the applied MFN tariff rate, while textiles, 
footwear and rice did not probably take much proportion. Thailand imported mainly 
manufacturers from Japan at applied average MFN tariff rate of 8.2%54. In fact, the 2003 joint 
economic effect study on trade liberalization between Japan and Thailand concluded that an FTA 
would provide macroeconomic gains to Japan and Thailand55. 
(c) Special Regulations and Provisions: 
 JTEPA could be deemed as a comprehensive FTA. It was even claimed to eliminate 
tariffs on 97% of Japan’s exports to Thailand and 92% of Japan’s imports from Thailand within 
10 years, meaning that it meets the requirement of the GATT XXIV: 856. In regard to tariff 
elimination, Japan made a commitment to eliminate almost all the products such as live animals, 
products made thereof, agricultural produces, apparels and clothing, wood, and manufactures 
either immediately on entry into force or in installments mostly within 8 or 10 years, with 
exception of very few products. Particularly, rice and wheat or products made thereof were 
completely excluded. In reciprocity, Thailand promised to eliminate tariffs immediately on live 
animals and mostly in installments on agricultural produce, rice, and manufacturers57. In addition, 
JTEPA specifically prohibits parties from exercising “export subsidy on agricultural products”, 
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applying “non-tariff measures”, but allows for balance-of-payment measure, and “safeguard 
measure” to salvage injurious industries via the agreed-upon procedure58. 
 To obtain the preferential tariff treatment, any product exported to Japan or Thailand 
needs to obtain a certificate of origin from the “competent governmental authority” of either 
exporting party. To be eligible for a certificate of origin, any product shall satisfy the following 
rules of origin specified under JTEPA. First is the “wholly obtained” condition mainly for 
agricultural product59 . Second is a change in tariff classification (CTC) for non-originating 
material undergoing specific manufacturing or processing 60 . Third, the “value content 
requirement” is 40% of local content of the F.O.B value of imports. The content from the party 
used by the originating party is also incorporated to fulfill 40% local content requirement, which 
is accumulation. Finally, if a product is transported directly to the party from the originating 
party, or transits or is stored temporarily in a non-party’s territory without going through 
significant operation, except “unloading or reloading or preservation”, the product should also be 
conferred its origin status as it is from the exporting party61. 
 In addition, chapters on trade in service, investment, and movement of natural persons are 
worthy of review. For trade in service, JTEPA adopted a positive list approach. For example, 
arbitration and conciliation, fishing, radio and television, gambling and betting services, are 
marked “unbound” for all modes in Japan’s schedule of specific commitments. In addition, 
JTEPA stipulates national treatment, most-favored nation (MFA) treatment62, and compensation 
for any measures affecting trade in service and investment. Investors shall be given the 
“protection from strife” in the territory of either party63. In regard to the movement of natural 
person, Japan specifically commits itself to allowing the stay of not less than 1 year for Thai 
nationals who are “intra-corporate” employees, investors, “legal, accounting and taxation 
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services suppliers qualified under Japanese law”, instructors, and those engaging in business 
activities of advanced knowledge and technology.64 
(d) Effect of JTEPA: 
 Generally, both countries would have a much tighter and closer economic 
interdependence, and the resulting stronger political relationship, after the conclusion of JTEPA. 
Obviously from the legal text itself, Japan and Thailand could draw many benefits through tariff 
reduction, elimination and other commitments reciprocally made by both parties. Thailand could 
expand its exports to include more of textiles, apparels, agricultural products, wood and many 
others, which Thailand has a comparative advantage over Japan65. Likewise, since about 90.2% 
of Japan’s 2006 total exports to the world were manufactures, Japan could increase her 
manufacture exports. For example, Japan’s auto accessories and spare parts could be exported at 
a phase-out tariff rate from 20% and automobiles with engines over 3,000 cc are exported at 60% 
tariff rate to Thailand66. Thus, both countries’ trade volumes would increase. 
 Japan and Thailand could also benefit from other provisions of JTEPA. Japanese service 
suppliers and investors who are doing businesses in Thailand would formally receive legal rights 
from the Thai government: national treatment and protection from strife. Meanwhile, Thailand, 
hosting about 215 Japanese investors in 2002, would be expecting more investors from Japan. 
Japanese investments accounted for about 45% of total investments in Thailand67. Furthermore, 
Thailand would benefit from technology and knowledge transfer through cooperation with 
Japanese government, as is set out in Article 153 of JTEPA. Thai nationals would also benefit 
from the commitments made by Japan for the movement of natural person, so do Japanese 
nationals. Thai employees or suppliers68 would work in Japan under a more relaxed procedure.  
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CHAPTER 4 
METHODOLOGY 
This chapter will demonstrate the methods utilized by the researcher. The quantitative 
and empirical research is used to focus on the effectiveness of the RTAs in the APEC countries, 
basically focus on Thailand. Thailand was chosen as it is the founder member of APEC and 
ASEAN forum and it is one of the fastest growing economy in the East Asia; engaging RTAs 
with APEC member and non-member economies. Quantitative and empirical methods were 
discarded from the secondary data. The design was both exploratory, to know and evaluate the 
effect of the Thai economy due to adoption of trade liberalization policies, and descriptive, to be 
able to describe the various mechanisms and make stronger recommendations. Some 
macroeconomic indicators sectoral data related to trade policy will be analyzed and related prior 
research was also focused. Procedures for collecting and analyzing the data were presented, 
followed by a discussion of the validity and reliability of those methods.  
This study firstly utilized quantitative research in order to focus on effect of RTAs. 
Quantitative data were collected from the secondary sources as quantitative data properly explain 
the effect of trade liberalizations in the various sectors in Thailand. In the previous chapter the 
Thai economic conditions, policy measures and different RTAs with other APEC member 
economies were discussed. The following research chapter will highlight on the main five 
hypotheses; firstly whether regional integration increases consumer welfare, trade, and 
investment of Thai economy. Secondly whether, these regional arrangements facilitate Thai 
economy to remove tariff and non-tariff barriers more than WTO. Thirdly, it has induced Thai 
economy’s bargaining capacity with the powerhouse economy like USA, EU. Finally trade 
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creation gains are greater than trade diversion and it positively affect the consumer welfare of 
Thai economy. 
In order to evaluate current situation of the Thai economy and impact of trade 
liberalization for regional integration (RTAs) some vital macroeconomic indicators data were 
collected from the period from 1990 to 2007. Basically, Thailand started this RTAs in 1992 
(AFTA, 1992) and exclusively from 2003. This period of statistical data focused on the 
comparative relationship of free trade policy adoption and economic change. This period also 
covered the Asia economic crisis period, which helped to demonstrate whether this trade 
liberalization induced the Thai economy to absorb the crisis. This result analysis also compared 
with the previous studies of welfare gains from integration. Quantitative data was collected from 
the WTO, UNCTAD, IMF, Bank of Thailand, and APEC statistical data sources. For empirical 
resources were collected from Joint investigation commission reports on RTAs among the APEC 
and ASEAN members and some simulations on it which were earlier done by the renowned 
economist.      
This study utilizes a variety of valid and reliable instruments under the framework of 
quantitative research, in order to fully analyze the effects of RTAs negotiations of APEC 
member economies and provide solid recommendations. Trade and administrative policy reform 
in Thailand and other APEC countries are evidence of new trend of trade blocs and present 
empirical study reflected how much these countries can gain really and what are the features of 
these regional integrations. The next chapter will present the result of these methods.   
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CHAPTER 5 
RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS OF RESULT 
Introduction:  
APEC region represents the most dynamic region in the world. Member countries are 
entering RTAs with the member and non-member countries as they believe that regional 
integration bring sustainable development. Economic integration increases mostly in the East 
Asia and Pacific Island region in the banner of APEC and ASEAN forum. Empirical statistics 
shows that in this region inward and outward investment boost-up intensively. This study sought 
to determine the main effect of regional integration in this area, and how they could be overcome. 
The impact of this is a more intrusive regional cooperation leading to common market operation 
like EU. Earlier lot of research done on this regard, no study had analyzed the country base 
policy liberalization and its impact. This study therefore utilized a logical framework adoption in 
APEC future plan and member countries IAPs and CAPs regarding that mission and its impact 
on their economy. It will not be convenient to analyze all the member’s economy, Thailand is 
chosen for the empirical study. In chapter three we have analyses Thai economy, measures of 
investment flows, some treaties with other APEC member countries. 
 This chapter will present the result and analysis of the results as they related to the 
overall research questions, and provide supporting evidence for the main arguments. 
Recommendation for the policy maker will be presented in the next chapter based on the result of 
this chapter which will help the APEC and ASEAN policymaker for their future plan of action 
on relation their forum and member counties interest. Moreover this study will work out on five 
hypothesis whether these Regional Trade Arrangements’ really increase the trade creation, 
investment and consumer welfare of Thai economy, and if so, what is the reason behind this? It 
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will also analyze whether this integration increases the bargaining capacity of Thailand with 
other powerhouse economy as well as economic growth. Remaining chapter will analyze on the 
basis of the hypothesis.     
5.1 Interregional RTAs increases the consumer welfare, investment and trade share of 
Thailand in the world economy. 
Thailand has RTAs with developed countries like Australia, New Zealand, and Japan and 
emerging economy like Singapore an China. Moreover, the Thai government is trying to 
negotiate a Free Trade Agreement with the USA, as the United States is the main exporting 
partner69. To examine this hypothesis we have to analysis both the pre and post trade volume, 
consumption and investment level of Thailand. Table 1 show a trend data of Thai economy 
within the period from 1995 to 2006, which will help to properly analyze the overall condition of 
Thai economy.    
 Within this twelve year period of time both export (US$ 56 to US$ 131 billion) and 
import (US$ 71 to US$ 129 billion) volume increases gradually in contest of the whole world 
economy. After the Asian economic crisis the Thai economy was in difficulties and it was 
reflected in the import sector, which sharply declined up to 2002 and then recovered moderately. 
From the fiscal period 2000-2006 annual percentage of change in merchandise export, f.o.b. and 
merchandise import, f.o.b. were 11% and 13%, respectively. Yearly basis percentage change, 
mostly in 2005 (14% and 25%) and in 2006 (19% and 11%), which shows bilateral treaties with 
the partner countries induces their exports and imports. Most of the RTAs were enacted in 1995 
(TNCEP, TAFTA, TJCER) and in graph-1 shows the positive effect in export as the Thai 
government follows export-oriented economic growth. The breakdown of economic commodity 
export items are manufacturing (75.3%), agricultural products (16.5%), and fuels and mining 
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products (6.4%). Import commodities are manufacturing (66.8%), fuel and mining products 
(24.9%). At the time of treaty discussion it is already mentioned that Thailand has a big market 
of agricultural product in Japan and manufacturer’s products (vehicles), mainly exported to 
Australia and New Zealand.   
Figure 1 
 
Figure 2 
 
Through these RTAs the Thai economy liberalized it service sectors and it increased 
commercial service trade dramatically. Within the year 2000-2006, commercial services export 
and import growth rates are 10% and 13% consequently. Year base discussion will specify the 
impact of these RTAs on commercial services, export and import in service sectors were 6% and 
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18% in 2005 which extended to 20% in both in export and import in 2006. Breakdown service 
sectors are travel, transportation and other commercial services (telecommunication, human 
resource development training, education, medical service). Figure 3 shows the gradual 
expansion of the economic sectors of Thai economy. Expansion of the service sector is 
remarkable in the figure. In 1990 the agricultural sector was the most dominating sector of 
employment, and by 2005 the service sector became the second largest sector for employment. 
This diametrical expansion is due to the investment boom in service sector in Thai economy. 
Figure - 3 
 
In the course of interregional integration Thai government induces their market to absorb 
external shocks voluntarily. The Thai government has liberalized their service sectors by 
introducing APEC Business Travel Card (ABTC), one stop service center, administrative and 
financial sectors reforms that attract huge FDI from Japan, China and Australia. For example, the 
Japanese company Toyota established the Toyota Technical Center Asia Pacific in Thailand in 
2005. Australian and New Zealand companies are investing largely in law consultation, 
education, and construction services. This expansion in export and import comparatively reduces 
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the product price and increases the production efficiency of Thai product. CTFTA facilitates 
Thai consumer to consume qualitative fruits and vegetables at a cheaper rate. Meanwhile 
TAFTA and TNCEP enables Thai consumers to consume milk, butter and milk contained 
product at a comprehensive rate, as well fulfill the shortage of milk and milk contained products. 
Therefore RTAs increase the welfare gain of Thai consumer and this result coincides with the 
joint commission report on TAFTA.          
5.2 Regional Trade Agreements and Free Trade Agreements facilitate Thailand to remove 
tariff and non-tariff barriers more than WTO (MFN bound rate). These sharp declines in 
tariff and non-tariff effect positively in Thai balance of payment and trade volumes with 
the partner countries. 
"Busan Roadmap towards Bogor" highlights on the multilateral trading system, trade 
facilitation, a comprehensive work plan on RTAs, structure base CAPs and IAPs with 
strengthened review processes, and improvement of the behind-the-border business environment. 
The Busan Roadmap presents a forward-looking and ambitious proposal with clear milestones to 
steer APEC members towards the Bogor Goal. Thailand is one of the founder members of APEC, 
through IAP and CAP it is reducting its tariff and non-tariff barriers. The rate is substantially 
lower than MFN applied rate in WTO. As a developing country member of WTO Thailand’s 
simple average final bind tariff rate is 28.27% (agricultural goods 40.7% and non-agricultural. 
goods 25.5%), agricultural tariff quotas and SSGs in agricultural sectors are 4.6% and 7.8% 
consequently. Whereas Thailand is reducing its tariff rates sharply 40.8% to 17% within the 
period from 1988 to 1996, which is the highest sharp decline rate among APEC members 
(Appendix A). To achieve the Bogor goal Thai government has IAPs to eliminate the tariff level 
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for all APEC members by 2020.  In addition Thailand has international obligations and with 
other members of the global society by further unilateral tariff liberalization. 
In 1996, Thai tariff preferences were only extended to ASEAN member countries under 
the AFTA scheme. Under AFTA, as of 1 January 2007, tariff rates on 80% of tariff lines were 
eliminated and the remaining tariff rates will be eliminated in 2010 except 10 tariff lines which 
are consider as sensitive products. Under the ASEAN-China FTA (Early Harvest Program) tariff 
rates on products in Chapter 01-08 were eliminated since 1 January 2006; normal track of tariff 
rates will be eliminated by 2010 and for sensitive products it will be only 5% from 2018. The 
Thailand-Australia FTA (TAFTA) was signed on 5 July 2004 and entered into force on 1 
January 2005. Thailand eliminated tariff rates on 2,724 items when the agreement entered into 
force. For most of the remaining products, tariff rates will be reduced to 0% by 2010.The 
TNCEP was signed on 19 April 2005 and entered into force on 1 July 2005. Under the TNCEP 
approximately 50% of Thailand’ imports from New Zealand are duty free. The tariff rates on 
most of products will be reduced to 0% by 2010 and tariff rates on sensitive products will be 
reduced to 0% by 2015. The JTEPA was signed on 3 April 2007 and entered into force on 1 
November 2007 that facilitates approximately 45% of Thailand’s imports from Japan are duty 
free. Tariff rates on most of products will be reduced to 0% by 201270. 
Thailand maintains tariff rate quotas (TRQ) on 23 agricultural products. The application 
of TRQ complies fully with the WTO Agreement. In 2003, Thailand expanded its tariff quota 
and lowered its applied in-quota tariff rates below its WTO commitments. For example, soybean 
and seed potato, under tariff quota imports are not limited with 0% tariff rate, Soybean cake, 
unlimited imports with 4% tariff rate whereas the quantity and the in-quota tariff rate committed 
under WTO Agreement are 229,339 tons and 20% respectively71. 
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Moreover, Thailand has already reduced non-tariff barriers through the ABTC issue for 
natural person movement, reformation of Thai financial services sector, and administrative 
sectors, which is 100% asset ownership of foreign investors. “One-Stop Service Center” for 
Visas and Work is Permitted since 1997 and reformation of business rules; the Alien Business 
Law of 1972 to “The Foreign Business Act B.E. 2542 (1999)” makes the investment Thai sector 
attractive. The Thai economy is trying to reduce all the tariff and non-tariff barriers of trade 
throughout the implementation of the best practices for RTAs in APEC countries which will help 
to adjust with the threat of widening development gap between developed and developing 
countries. All of these attempts are more than WTO or WTO plus facilitation for the APEC 
members. 
Thailand has RTAs with Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Singapore and China. It is also 
negotiating for free trade agreement with USA and EU which are 1st and 2nd exporting partner 
(Appendix D). These RTAs induce Thailand to liberalize tariff and non-tariff barriers on trade in 
goods and services over and above investment. For example, TAFTA enables zero tariff rates for 
Thai product to Australian market by 2010 and Australian product in Thai market by 2015; 
applied tariff-rate quotas (TRQ) on 23 Thai agricultural product’s tariff elimination deadline is 
by 2025. Whereas the WTO has not yet completed it negotiation on TRQ elimination and natural 
person movement barriers eliminations, which makes the Thai economy able to compete in the 
world economy.  
These relatively sharp declines in tariff and non-tariff have positive effects in Thai 
balance of payment and trade volumes with the partner countries (Appendix F). CTFTA 
expanded Thai export from US$ 6285 to US$ 19033 million in the period 2000 to 2006 and 
which makes China the 2nd largest export partner of Thailand (Appendix E). Meanwhile JTEPA 
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enables Japan 1st largest importing and 3rd largest exporting partner. Reduction of tariff and non-
tariff barriers in Japanese market ensures Thai agricultural products in Japan. This result 
coincides with the simulation of trade liberalization of in APEC countries. Lee, Roland-Holst 
and Vander Mensbrugghe showed under MFN liberalization the real GDP of non-member 
countries US$ 16 billion by 2020 in their “General Equilibrium Assessments of Trade 
Liberalization in APEC Countries”. They also added real GDPs in developed and developing 
APEC member countries are predicted to increase by US$ 42 billion and US$ 83 billion 
respectively within the year 2000 to 2020 as they are liberalizing their tariff and non-tariff 
barriers. Additionally the simulation result shows China, Japan, the US and Taiwan benefit the 
most in absolute terms but the Philippines, Vietnam and Thailand see the highest increases (1-
3%) in percentage terms. This prediction is not appropriate in all terms, as China, Russian 
Federation, Peru, Vietnam, Singapore and Philippine gains most; Thailand, Chile their gain in 
relatively lower in percentage terms (Appendix B).  
5.3 Bilateral negotiations expand the economic growth and bargaining capacity of Thailand 
with other powerhouse economy like European Union, United States, India, and Canada, 
which will uphold Thai geo-political image in the other international forum.  
Thailand is a founder member of The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN, 
1967), Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC, 1989) and also member of WTO (1995). It is 
acting as a vocal member of developing countries in various international forum; active member 
in Corns Groups of WTO. Thailand hosted APEC in 2003 and began an 18-month term as chair 
of ASEAN in July 2008. These activities participation in WTO, APEC, and ASEAN Thailand 
got expertise in negotiation and deal making. 
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Being a member of APEC and ASEAN forum Thailand is trying to work as hub nations 
with the other countries; other economies are trying to enter the ASEAN big market. From the 
strategic point of view it is negotiating its bilateral and regional agreements with the big 
economies and with the strategic partners. Among the ASEAN countries Singapore and Thailand 
are in advanced position to deal regional agreements. They have RTAs with all the APEC big 
economies like Japan, China, Australia and New Zealand and trying to negotiate with other 
important trade partners; USA, EU, India and Peru (Appendix G). This strategy of Thai 
government makes sense of multilateralism trading prospects. After the Asian economic crisis 
the Thai economy adopted outward looking view and trade liberalization procedures to absorbed 
the transitional pressures. 
Bilateral Agreement with China and Japan made the Thai economy an affluent trading 
partner to the other big economies like the United States, EU, and India. These countries want to 
enter the ASEAN market via the Thai market; from the ASEAN Rules of Origins local content 
requirement is 40%. Thailand has liberalized it trade in goods and services that facilitate USA, 
EU and Indian investors to access the market of ASEAN and China. Thailand is negotiating 
RTAs with two perspective ways; market assessment and technical support. As it is technically 
less developed it negotiated RTAs with Australia and New Zealand even though they hold minor 
share in trading sectors (3.3% and 0.4%) (Appendix G).  
 In addition “The US-Japan economic problem” should come forward, as Thailand has 
signed an agreement with Japan. Japan wants to control on trade in Pacific Basin area whereas 
USA has few bilateral trade relation with this area. USA is mostly concentrating on NAFTA 
members. As the USA wants to extend its relations in the Asia Pacific region geopolitically, 
Thailand is in powerful position after Singapore. The EU and India are also enthusiastically 
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proceeding for further negotiating trade agreement with Thailand. Geographically Thailand is in 
favorable position to negotiate with South East Asia, North Asia and Pacific Island. It has 
bilateral security and commercial agreements and a long-standing defense relationship with the 
United States. The United States is Thailand's major trading partner (Appendix E and F). Both 
USA and Thai government is hopeful to complete the agreement by 2009. This strategic action 
increases the GDP growth rate and quick recovers of economic crisis of Thailand (Appendix B). 
In 2006 total FDI was US$ 68,058 million which is 33% of its GDP and it is the second largest 
FDI flows among South-East Asian countries after Singapore. 
5.4 The welfare effects of tariffs cutting through RTAs are overwhelmingly positive; trade- 
creation gains outweigh trade-diversion losses and provide a positive impact for the faster 
growing export in Thailand. Appendix: E & F  
Thailand recognizes the significant role trade facilitation plays in the development of 
business conditions conducive to trade and also in the reduction of business transaction costs. 
APEC members have reduced the business transaction cost by 5% in 2006 and it extended its 
plan to further reduction of transaction cost 5% by 2010. Business sector involvement in trade 
facilitation has been encouraged through regular information-sharing sessions and consultations. 
Among the APEC countries China, Thailand, and Viet Nam are developing and transition 
economies with low incomes and high dependence on FDI72. Inward FDI flows basically depend 
upon the FDI performance rate; FDI performance rate dramatically increases in Brunei 
Darussalam, H.K. China, Singapore, and Viet Nam (Appendix H). Whereas performance in 
Thailand reduces sharply compare to other APEC countries. Thailand had been in the top 20 
from 1988-1991, but fell to the 70s in the years leading up to the Asian Crisis and worse 
situation is it has been ranked 107s in the year 2004. This was largely due to the negative image 
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it projected after it imposed capital controls in 1998, during the Asian Currency Crisis. FDI is 
mainly diverted to Brunei Darussalam, China Viet Nam, Peru, and Singapore. From the 
experience of economic crisis Thailand took outward looking policies and as well as technology 
development strategy. Continuation of this strategy Thai government imitated several regional 
agreements like CTFTA (2003), China ASEAN FTA (2001) TAFTA (2005), TZCEP (2005), and 
TJEPA (2007) which bring technological development and performance rate become better than 
earlier and FDI gradually increases. For instance Australian investment in Thailand is US $1,398 
million in 2007, which is 29.2% increase in relative to the year 200673. 
Thailand reduces its tariff and non-tariff barriers, other administrative rules and 
regulations for these regional agreements. Trade expansion is not as much as Thailand deserved 
from TAFTA and TZCEP and volume of trade share in Australia (3.3% exports, 2.6% imports) 
and New Zealand (0.4% exports, 0.2% imports) are extremely nominal. The Thai economy gains 
mostly from CTFTA and TJEPA regional agreement, a lion share of Thai export and imports are 
with China and Japan (Appendix E & F). Due to sharp tariff and non-tariff reduction create a 
negative impact on the domestic infant industries and agricultural sectors of the Thai economy. 
In view of early harvest programmers under China ASEAN FTA and CTFTA; Thailand and 
China imposed zero tariff rates on vegetables and fruits that result Thai domestic vegetables and 
fruits lose their share in domestic market and which create an “exclusion effect” of some Thai 
agricultural product.  
A partial free trade agreement (FTA) between Thailand and China has led to a decline in 
Thailand’s garlic output by 22% in three years. Study conducted by Kasetsart University, on 
“The Health Policy Foundation and FTA Watch” shown Thailand’s garlic production fell from 
96,000 tons in 2004 to 75,000 tons in 2007, as cheaper imported garlic from China flooded the 
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market after the inking of the Thai-Chinese RTA in 2003 74 . Researchers from Kasetsart 
University, studying the economic and social impact on the lower classes of RTA between 
Thailand and China added that the people in the North and Northeast are suffering in terms of 
higher debt burdens. Professor Detcharat Sukkamnerd has shown, the product price is now in the 
hands of a few big importers and they control upon the whole market, which implies market 
distortion, as well as consumer welfare reduction. The welfare gains are offset by the drastic 
increase in percentage of consumer price (4.54% in 2005 and 4.64% in 2006) and producer price 
(Table1). Even though, CEIs Sydney, Australia’s pre studies on the welfare effect of TAFTA, 
joint commission study report on TNCEP and simulations on ASEAN+3 and AFTA predicted 
that absolute gain will be bigger for Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Viet Nam75 . Thai 
consumers are comparatively better off as they can enjoy the diary product, fruits and vegetable 
at a cheaper rate and export also increases gradually in China and Japan (Appendix E). These 
gains are little bit offset by the drastic increase in percentage of consumer price (4.54% in 2005 
and 4.64% in 2006) and producer price (Table1).  
5.5 Regional Trade Agreement (RTA) will make a smooth path for multilateral negotiation 
of WTO. 
 
Since 1996, when Thailand became the member of the WTO, Thailand has remained 
firmly committed to the creation of an open and fairer multilateral trading system.  As such, 
Thailand has supported the WTO multilateral trading process and remains steadfast to the 
implementation of all WTO provisions and obligations and the Doha Development Agenda.  As 
shown above, Thailand has amended and enacted several laws and regulations not only to open 
the domestic markets but also to facilitate the full and effective implementation of the WTO 
Agreement. For instance, under the TBT and SPS Agreements, Thailand has made 262 and 116 
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notifications, respectively. Thailand has enacted WTOs new Anti-dumping and Countervailing 
Act in 1999. 
Regardless, the Thai government has smoothly implemented the harmonized system (HS) 
by 2007. Thailand has amended the Trademark Act in 2000, and the Patent Act in 1999 and also 
enacted the Copyright Act B.E. 2537 (1994), the Plant Varieties Protection Act B.E. 2542 (1999), 
the Protection of Layout Designs of Integrated Circuits Act B.E. 2543 (2000), the Trade Secrets 
Act B.E. 2545 (2002), and the Protection of Geographical Indications Act B.E. 2546 (2003). 
Other then that the Thai government has enacted a new Foreign Business Law and a Trade 
Competition Act in 1999 so as to promote foreign direct investment and fair business practices. 
Thailand has fully implemented the Uruguay Round Final Schedule on tariff concession. 
On Agriculture, Thailand has progressively reduced tariffs on 748 items, which must be reduced 
by 24 % by 2004 as scheduled.  Also, in place of non-tariff barriers, Thailand now applied tariff 
quotas for 23 items.  Moreover, Thailand has continued to reduce domestic support on 
agricultural sector, for example support reduced from 22,000 million Baht to 19,000 million Baht 
by 2004.The phase-out plan for the dairy industry to eliminate local content requirement on dairy 
product has been completed. Thailand terminated this local content requirement measures on 
dairy product on 31st December 2003. The local content requirement on automobile parts and 
accessories was abolished in 2000. Other than this Thailand promulgates Safeguard Measures 
Act, B.E. 2550, which has come into force on 6th April 2008.  
Regional trade agreements made the Thai economy in a cooperatively better position, in 
terms of trade. Thailand completely liberalized its service sectors especially in the free trade 
agreement like TAFTA, TZCEP, and JTEPA. Service sector an influential part of Thai export as 
60% export earning comes from service sectors. Through the expansion of service sector 
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employment in service sector increase moderately. Telecommunication, real estate, education, 
human development training, and tourism sectors expanded its work. ECOTECH has played an 
inevitable role in helping less developed member economies strengthen their capacity to catch up 
with and to benefit from the liberalization process. Income gap between developed and 
developing countries increases constantly. In such circumstances, enhanced ECOTECH 
cooperation has become all the more important to ensure the shared development among APEC 
member economies. Thailand is also working to promote technological development with other 
APEC member countries through RTA negotiation and this will in turn promote sustainable 
development and heighten the spirit of community.  
In the Asia Pacific region labor movement from low to high productivity and large 
accumulation of machinery cooperation of technology transfer to member economies induces 
remarkable growth in labor productivity. This region has extended the highest labor productivity 
(5.4%) from 2000 to 2005. Thailand is also actively participating in the expansion of labor 
productivity through bilateral investment treaty and RTAs with potential economies that help 
Thai economy to compete in the world economy. Now, Thailand actively participated in APEC 
and WTO forums with respect to work undertaken in the area of mobility of business people. 
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CHAPTER 6 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR APEC 
 This research find that trade liberalization has huge impact on the developing economy 
like Thailand. From the analysis of hypothesis with empirical data we can gaze that drastic 
liberalization on trade is not to a great extent for the welfare and development. Thailand adopted 
early harvest program through CTFTA that cause exclusion effect in some agricultural product. 
Even though Thai economy is expanding towards industry and service sectors, agriculture is still 
important sector in Thai economy and it contributes 11% on its GDP. Sharp liberalization 
negatively impact on agricultural growth which indicate liberalization should take place step by 
step and there need some transitional period to absorb external shock. From the analysis we also 
find that growth in service sector push up the economic growth in Thailand and in some sense it 
indicates that Thai economy is overcoming the Asian crisis in 1997/98. Reduction of 
unemployment, growth of exchange rate in terms of dollar enhances its economic power, balance 
of payment as well as bargaining capacity. Political disturbance in 2006, rapid change in policies 
and sharp tariff reduction in agricultural sector results Thai economic growth at steady level from 
5% to 4.7%.   
(1) It is well known that RTA among the countries increases their consumer welfare, 
production efficiency and reduce the income inequality. Actually this theme is theoretical and its 
effect depends upon the conditions of the treaty and bindings of the members. Terms and 
conditions, rules of origin, technical support, investment liberalization conditions all the 
technical terms generates whether a country will gain from the treaty or not and what will be the 
impact on the domestic sensitive sectors. As Thailand is a faster growing developing country it 
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should build up its negotiation capability with the other country that will ensure the bigger gain 
than the losses. Pre qualification study is essential for a better RTA; it may be joint commission 
study or an individual research institute, which will calculate all the macroeconomic aspect and 
sectoral position of each country through this agreement. Thailand should also develop research 
commission under the joint collaboration of Ministry of Trade and Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
which will evaluate pre and post impact of RTA and other treaties and give a proper guideline to 
resolve the problem.  
(2) Benefic from free trade arrangements depends on the country’s macroeconomic 
stability, good governance, and sound infrastructural position. Thai economy is passing its 
transitional period development. To increase its gain from RTA trade liberalization is one of the 
conditions and along with this government has to establish good governance, macroeconomic 
stability and infrastructural position to accommodate foreign investors. The Bank of Thailand 
and Borough of Investment (BOI) can take a strong role for macroeconomic stability. Good 
governance is very much related with the democratic government of a country and last three 
years there are some political instability in Thailand and it badly effect the economic growth, 
investment and trade gain. Democratic government should reflect people’s desire in the policy 
implementation and take necessary steps against corruptions. With the collaboration of other 
partner countries Thailand can ensure the infrastructural improvement which will facilitate both 
the domestic and foreign investors. 
(3) Successful economic development involves accumulating physical and human capital 
and reducing of knowledge gap between the developing and developed countries. The economic 
success of Thailand depends on effective and market friendly government interventions. Key 
elements related to development are promotion of high levels of domestic savings and 
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investment, efficient allocation of investment funds, sound fiscal and monetary policies, and 
accumulation of human capital. Development history of East Asia reflects that FDI seems to an 
important mechanism for the transfer of technology and knowledge. FDI is not only transfer of 
capital but also transfer of knowledge and FDI depends on the inward performance of projects. 
So human capital development, transfer of knowledge, FDI inflows all are correlated with each 
other. Early 90th Thailand was in favorable position in FDI inflows but now other neighbor 
countries captures that position. Administrating reform, proper fiscal and monetary policy 
adoption, technology transfer from developed partner countries can ensure Thai economic 
development and welfare of consumer. Moreover government of Thailand should encourage the 
investment on R & A and promote the human development training. 
(4) Agricultural, industrial and service are equally important for balance economic 
growth. Even though service sector accounted 60% of export earning in Thailand, agricultural 
and industrial sectors also posses the same importance for its economy. Thai government has to 
emphasize on the industrial and agricultural along with the service sectors at the time of policy 
formulation. Agricultural sector is an important sector for Thai economy as it accounts 10% of 
its GDP growth rate.  At the time of taking liberalization policy it should consider gradual 
liberalization. Especially in sensitive agricultural sectors, infant industry protection, and export 
promotion policies should be consider on the priority basis. As we have seen early harvest 
program under CTFTA creates exclusion effect in some agricultural sectors. Tariff cut policy 
should consider transitional period which will help the domestic agricultural producers to adjust 
with the new policy and market competition with the imported product. Govt. of Thailand should 
adopt some policies to protect infant industry and promote export promotion incentive to the 
industry which will help the domestic industry to compete in the world economy. 
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(5) The fruits of economic growth are not always equally distributed. Unequal 
distribution of income causes expanding income disparity among the people which results 
political and social unrest. In case of Thailand people in the North and Northeast are suffering in 
terms of higher debt burdens which has causes its political turmoil and social unrest. Recently 
opposition group make block in the Thai airports that will effect it other investment and tourism 
sector. Stable political government can ensure the equal distribution, investment growth and 
sound low and order situation.         
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION AND REMARKS: 
There is extended argument that wide range RTAs facilitate to extend countries trade, 
FDI, expansion of R&D program, GDP growth and the overall economic growth of a country. In 
reality it varies from country to country depending upon the policy adoption. For instance 
SUSFTA benefits the Singapore to continue its economic growth and consumer welfare which 
move forward to be the best economic power in East Asia. Meanwhile Mexico could expand its 
growth rate below 1% being a member of NAFTA. Overlapping RTAs might cause more trade 
diversion than trade creation which effects the investment, welfare of the consumer and overall 
development. 
There is some ambiguity in APEC’s internal and external relations among the members. 
Even though it declared tariff cutting program and achieve free trade in this region by 2020, but 
they fail to set up their vision and achieve the goal. Bogor Goal is the mission of APEC and 
member economies have not reach any consensus how to fulfill this target. APEC leaders have 
never seriously discussed about what will be the faith of trade liberalization and whether they 
will establish an APEC base RTAs. In reality, negotiation on trade liberalization has become a 
regular agenda in every APEC ministerial meeting and it makes pressure to the versatile interest 
of member economies. Wide range flexibility in the members IAPs of liberalization in tariff and 
non-tariff barriers creates extensive tension of free rider problem.  
APEC policymaker should encourage regional central banks to place their exchange rate 
objectives and deeply-held concerns for excessive exchange rate volatility within a flexible CPI-
inflation targeting regime framework. This policy adoption will anchor domestic monetary 
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policies and regional monetary cooperation to underlying welfare-based fundamentals. To extend 
the regional exchange rate stabilization APEC regional central banks can construct a common 
APEC Currency Unit based on both trade flows and capital flows. For instance EU common 
currency Euro becomes stronger than Dollar and it facilitate trade flows among the EU member 
countries. This would allow APEC policymakers in policy independence and sovereign 
flexibility, opportunities for deep macroeconomic policy cooperation, and an explicit exchange 
rate coordination mechanism. 
APEC has inconsistency with the principles of the multilateral trading system. GATT 
Article XXIV extensively allows FTA and CU as exceptions to unconditional MFN treatment. 
Tariff and non-tariff barrier liberalization and free trade region by 2010 and 2020 is violation 
unconditional MFN treatment as APEC member are getting the facilities of low tariff rate and 
other WTO members are excluded from that treatment. In future this action may challenged by 
the international community or loser country. APEC is a forum where both developed and 
developing countries are member and their focus of interest differs from each others.  Developed 
countries are interested on environment, investment, labor, deregulations and administrative 
reform whereas developing countries labor movement, investment, infrastructure development, 
technical support. These differences in thinking and ideology makes problem to reach a fruitful 
common goal. Meanwhile, member countries become reluctant in their commitment and trying 
to negotiate bilateral negotiation with other members and non-member countries which creates 
overlapping of RTAs, trade diversion, Hub and Spoke effects. 
USA is much concern about NAFTA members than APEC forum and maintains a        
geo political strategy in negotiation of RTAs with Asia and Pacific countries. It completed RTAs 
with only Japan, South Korea and Singapore. Japan and China has become bandwagon in 
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negotiating RTAs in major East Asian countries. Singapore and Thailand are active in 
negotiating and concluding RTAs. This practice ruins the APEC integrity and its becoming a 
forum of table talk of large commitments without any action. 
To resolve the problem and back in its powerful image APEC member countries should 
seriously about merge in a trading blocs or APEC FTA and common market like EU. This will 
boost up free movement of capital, investment and labor with the transfer of technical 
cooperation from the developed to developing countries. APEC‘s relationship with the WTO 
largely depends upon its contributions to a successful launch and completion of millennium 
round of the WTO. Now it’s time for APEC to consider seriously about its long term vision and 
this vision should be related with the multilateral negotiation of the WTO.      
    
 
 
 
 
 .   
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Appendix A 
Unweighted average tariffs on APEC economies from 1998 to 1996 
    
Country 1988 1993 1996 
Australia 15.6 9 6.1 
Brnuei Darussalam 3.9 3.9 2 
Canada 9.1 8.8 6.7 
Chile 19.9 14.9 10.9 
China 40.3 37.5 23 
Hong Kong, China 0 0 0 
Indonesia 20.3 17 13.1 
Japan 7.2 6.5 9 
Republic of Koria 19.2 11.6 7.9 
Malaysia 13 12.8 9 
Maxico 10.6 12.8 12.5 
New Zealand 15 8 7 
Philippines 27.9 23.5 15.6 
Singapore 0.4 0.4 0 
Taiwan 12.6 8.9 8.6 
Thailand 40.8 37.8 17 
United States 6.6 6.6 6.4 
Average 15.4 12.9 9.1 
Source: 1998-1993 from APEC (1995a), data from UNCTAD 1996 from APEC member’s 
Independent Action Plan 
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Appendix B 
 Real GDP Growth in APEC Member Economies, 2000 - 2007  
             (Annual Percent Change) 
Country 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Australia 3.4 2.1 4.1 3.0 3.8 2.8 2.8 3.9 
Brunei 
Darussalam 2.9 2.7 3.9 2.9 0.5 0.4 5.1 0.4 
Canada 5.2 1.8 2.9 1.9 3.1 3.1 2.8 2.7 
Chile 4.5 3.5 2.2 4.0 6.0 5.7 4.0 5.0 
China, People's 
Republic of 8.4 8.3 9.1 10.0 10.1 10.4 11.1 11.4 
Hong Kong, 
China 8.0 0.5 1.8 3.0 8.5 7.1 7.0 6.3 
Indonesia 5.4 3.6 4.5 4.8 5.0 5.7 5.5 6.3 
Japan 2.9 0.2 0.3 1.4 2.7 1.9 2.4 2.1 
Korea 8.5 3.8 7.0 3.1 4.7 4.2 5.1 5.0 
Malaysia 8.7 0.5 5.4 5.8 6.8 5.0 5.9 6.3 
Mexico 6.6 0.0 0.8 1.4 4.2 2.8 4.8 3.3 
New Zealand 3.9 2.7 5.2 3.4 4.5 2.8 1.5 3.0 
Papua New 
Guinea -2.5 -0.1 -0.2 2.2 2.7 3.4 2.6 6.2 
Peru 3.0 0.2 5.0 4.0 5.1 6.7 7.6 9.0 
Philippines 6.0 1.8 4.4 4.9 6.4 4.9 5.4 7.3 
Russia 10.0 5.1 4.7 7.3 7.2 6.4 7.4 8.1 
Singapore 10.1 -2.4 4.2 3.5 9.0 7.3 8.2 7.7 
Chinese Taipei 5.8 -2.2 4.6 3.5 6.2 4.2 4.9 5.7 
Thailand 4.8 2.2 5.3 7.1 6.3 4.5 5.1 4.8 
United States 3.7 0.8 1.6 2.5 3.6 3.1 2.9 2.2 
Vietnam 6.8 6.9 7.1 7.3 7.8 8.4 8.2 8.5 
Note: Local currency based. 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, April 2008.  
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Appendix C 
Rank of APEC Member Economies in World Trade - 2007 
Country Export  
Position 
Import 
Position 
Australia 27th 20th 
Brunei Darussalam 88th 144th 
Canada 10th 10th 
Chile 40th 46th 
China, People's Republic of 2nd 3rd 
Hong Kong, China 13th 12th 
Indonesia 32th 32th 
Japan 4th 4th 
Korea 11th 13th 
Malaysia 19th 25th 
Mexico 15th 14th 
New Zealand 61th 52th 
Papua New Guinea 99th 131th 
Peru 59th 67th 
Philippines 48th 45th 
Russian Federation 12th 16th 
Singapore 14th 15th 
Chinese Taipei 16th 17th 
Thailand 25th 24th 
United States 3rd 1th 
Vietnam 50th 41th 
Source: World Trade Organization trade statistics data base. 
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Appendix D 
Main Import and Export Partner of APEC Member Economies 2007 
 
Country Export  Partner Import Partner 
Australia Japan, Canada, EU EU, China, USA 
Brunei Darussalam Japan, Indonesia, Korea Malaysia, Singapore, Japan
Canada USA, EU, China USA, EU, China 
Chile EU, USA, Japan USA, EU, Argentina 
China, People's Republic of EU, USA, HK.China Japan, EU, Korea 
Hong Kong, China China, EU, USA China, Japan, T.China 
Indonesia Japan, EU, USA Singapore,, China, EU 
Japan USA, China, EU China, USA, EU 
Korea China, EU, USA China, Japan, USA 
Malaysia USA, Singapore, EU Japan, China, EU 
Mexico USA, EU, Canada USA, EU, China 
New Zealand Australia, EU, USA Australia, EU, China  
Papua New Guinea EU, Australia, China Australia, USA, Singapore
Peru USA, EU, China  USA, China, EU 
Philippines EU, USA, Japan,  USA, Japan, EU, 
Russia Federation EU, Turkey, Ukraine EU, China, Turkey 
Singapore Malaysia, EU, China USA, EU, China 
Chinese Taipei China, HK.China, USA Japan, China, USA 
Thailand EU, USA, Japan Malaysia, Japan, China  
United States Canada, EU, Mexico EU, China, Canada 
Vietnam USA, EU, Japan China, Singapore, T.China
Source: World Trade Organization 
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Appendix: E 
Thailand’s Trade Share with the other potential Trade Partners:    
      
Country 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Trade 
Thailand       Exp 
 World Total Imp 
68963 
61923 
65113 
62057 
68850
64721
80318 
75824 
96242 
94410 
110174 
118158 
130783 
128634 
Share 
in % 
USA             Exp 
                     Imp 
14706 
7291 
13246 
7198 
13522
6197 
13669 
7185 
15498 
7271 
16950 
8724 
19670 
8673 
15%  
6.5% 
EU                Exp 
                     Imp 
11241 
6489 
10854 
7830 
10566
7312 
12229 
7822 
14364 
9434 
14955 
10782 
18099 
11241 
14% 
8.7% 
Japan            Exp 
                     Imp 
10164 
15315 
9964 
13881 
10000
14902
11395 
18267 
13459 
22379 
14986 
26029 
16571 
25845 
12.6%
20% 
China           Exp 
                     Imp 
6285 
4262 
6168 
4537 
7257 
5840 
10043 
7144 
12029 
9515 
15234 
12664 
19033 
15198 
14.5%
11.8%
Australia      Exp 
                     Imp   
1615 
1160 
1358 
1380 
1640 
1506 
2167 
1585 
2460 
2210 
3151 
3255 
4384 
3439 
3.3% 
2.6% 
New ZealandExp 
                     Imp 
182 
196 
182 
210 
205 
189 
267 
212 
329 
238 
518 
258 
513 
320 
0.4% 
0.2% 
Malaysia      Exp 
                     Imp   
2813 
3344 
2722 
3078 
2835 
3640 
3887 
4540 
5296 
5549 
5781 
8093 
6667 
8470 
5%  
6.6% 
 Singapore    Exp 
                     Imp 
5997 
3416 
5287  
2854 
5554 
2904 
5873   
3270 
7009  
4153 
7643  
5377 
8421  
5732 
6.4%  
4.4% 
 
Source: IMF, 2007. Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 2007 Page 496  
Trade share of Thailand with China is calculated addition of China Republic, Hong Kong and 
China. Macao. Export and import are in Millions of US$. 
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Appendix: F 
Thailand’s Trade Share with the Other Impotent Trade Partners and economic effect of 
RTAs :          
Country 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Trade 
Thailand       Exp 
World Total  Imp 
68963 
61923 
65113 
62057 
68850
64721
80318 
75824 
96242 
94410 
110174 
118158 
130783 
128634 
Share  
2007 
USA             Exp 
                     Imp 
14706 
7291 
13246 
7198 
13522
6197 
13669 
7185 
15498 
7271 
16950 
8724 
19670 
8673 
Imitating 
FTA 
EU                Exp 
                     Imp 
11241 
6489 
10854 
7830 
10566
7312 
12229 
7822 
14364 
9434 
14955 
10782 
18099 
11241 
Imitating 
closer pat
Japan            Exp 
                     Imp 
10164 
15315 
9964 
13881 
10000
14902
11395 
18267 
13459 
22379 
14986 
26029 
16571 
25845 
JTEPA 
Nov.2007
  -.2      
-.10  
+1     
+1 
+1.14 
+1.22  
+1.34  
+1.22 
+1.11  
+1.16 
+1.1     
-.01 
 
China           Exp 
                     Imp 
6285 
4262 
6168 
4537 
7257 
5840 
10043 
7144 
12029 
9515 
15234 
12664 
19033 
15198 
CTFTA  
Oct.2007
  -.02   
+1 
+1.77  
+1.29
+1.38   
+1.22 
+1.10  
+1.33 
+1.27  
+1.33 
+1.25  
+1.2 
 
Australia      Exp 
                     Imp    
1615 
1160 
1358 
1380 
1640 
1506 
2167 
1585 
2460 
2210 
3151 
3255 
4384 
3439 
TAFTA 
Jan.2007
  -.16  
+1.18 
+1.2  
+1.1 
+1.32   
+1 
+1.13  
+1.4 
+1.28  
+1 
+1.4   
+1 
 
New Zealand Exp 
                     Imp 
182 
196 
182 
210 
205 
189 
267 
212 
329 
238 
518 
258 
513 
320 
ZTCEP 
July.2007
  0 
+1 
+1.12   
-.1 
+1.3   
+1.12 
+1.23   
+1.12 
+1.57  
+1 
-.1      
1.24 
 
 
Source: IMF, 2007. Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 2007 Page 496  
Trade share of Thailand with China is calculated addition of China Republic, Hong Kong and 
China. Macao. Export and import are in Millions of US$. 
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Appendix G 
FTA of Thailand 
 
Signed Bilateral FTAs     Enforcement Date 
China Thailand FTA     Oct-03 
Thailand Australia Free Trade Agreement    Jan-05 
Thailand New Zealand Closer Economic Partnership  Jul-05 
Japan Thailand Economic Partnership Agreement Nov-07 
Proposal Bilateral FTAs     Negotiation  
USA Thailand FTA       Jun-05 
Peru Thailand FTA       Jun-05 
India Thailand FTA         
Thailand – EFTA Free Trade Agreement    Jun-05 
Multilater  Reional Agreement   Position 
China ASEAN FTA     Active 
China ASEAN + 6 FTA     Active 
ASEAN Japan FTA     Negotiation complete 
ASEAN +3 FTA     Negotiation 
ASEAN+CER     Negotiation complete 
ASEAN Korea FTA     Negotiation 
ASEAN India FTA     Negotiation 
ASEAN CEP + BIMISTEC   Negotiation 
Future Plans Regional Agreements   
East Asia Free Trade Area         
Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia    
 
Source: Individual Action Plan of Thailand to APEC 2008 
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Appendix H 
Inward FDI Performance Index Ranking 
 
Country 1990 1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Australia 16 46 91 64 69 40 111   
Brunei Da. 93 18 7 5 1 2 2   
Canada 38 68 34 34 75 97 97   
Chile 8 20 18 32 33 24 25   
China, Pe. 
Rep. 52 12 54 48 43 45 55   
H.K. China 3 13 2 3 8 6 3   
Indonesia 57 60 138 139 139 133 112   
Japan 110 128 128 133 136 134 131   
Korea 83 119 98 110 120 114 114   
Malaysia 4 6 53 74 82 64 62 62 
Mexico 36 42 74 65 62 77 75 82 
New Zealand 5 10 58 50 58 60 70 58 
Papua N.G. 2 8 52 96 92 101 104 129 
Peru 95 14 78 80 71 74 72 70 
Philippines 28 43 85 94 110 103 115 102 
Russia   111 104 112 97 89 87 87 
Singapore 1 2 5 6 6 7 5 5 
Thailand 17 72 46 87 90 107 49 52 
United States 43 91 76 92 113 116 120 117 
Vietnam 45 4 39 54 46 52 53 78 
 
Source: UNCTAD  
World Investment Report 2006 and 2007 page 278 
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Table 1               Thai Economy at a glance 
 
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Exports, f.o.b. 56 56 57 54 58 69 65 68 80 96 110 131 
Imports, f.o.b. 71 72 63 43 50 62 62 65 76 94 118 129 
Exp. Unit/Exp.p 109.5 119.1 117 103.7 100.5 100 101.3 96.2 104.9 117.9 129.8 138.9 
Imp. Unit/Imp.p 94.7 107.2 104.1 95.7 92.2 100 108.6 101.4 106 120.3 139.8 150.5 
Total Reserves 24293 26326 19490 20559 24905 24655 25832 28073 27734 31430 35561 43495 
Terms of Trade -3.2 -3.9 1.2 -3.7 0.7 -8.3 -6.8 1.8 4.3 -1 -5.3 -0.6 
GDP Volume  3.17 8.74 4.91 4.31 -3.18 4.8 2.2 5.3 7.1 6.3 4.5 5.1 
Producers prices 8.2 1.8 5.1 12.2 -4.7 3.9 2.5 1.7 4 6.7 9.1 7.1 
Consumer Prices 5.8 5.83 5.6 8.07 0.3 1.57 1.64 0.62 1.8 2.77 4.54 4.64 
Gross Cap. F % GDP  42.09 41.82 33.66 20.45 20.5 22.84 24.1 23.8 24.92 27.09 31.61 27.89 
F.Con.Exp % of GDP 63.07 63.96 64.74 65.21 67.46 67.46 68.61 68.32 67.87 67.79 68.74 67.7 
Gross D. I. % of GDP 42.10 41.80 33.70 20.40 20.50 22.80 24.10 23.80 25.00 26.80 31.50 27.90 
Nominal Excha. Rate           40.11 44.43 42.96 41.49 40.22 40.22 37.88 
 
Sources: International Financial Statistics Yearbook 2007, Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific 2007 (Gross Domestic 
Investment). Total Export and Import measures in Billions of US Dollars, Total Reserves measures in Millions of US dollars 
For Exp. Unit Value Export price and Import price. Unit Value per Import price indicates unit value (prices) in terms of Dollars: 
2000=100 Terms of Trade, GDP Volume, Producers price, Consumers price calculated % change over previous year; calculated from 
indices
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46  E-book from Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade “The New Zealand Thailand 
Closer Economic Partnership” P. 13 (www.mfat.govt.nz/downloads/trade-
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55 The task force report on Japan-Thailand economic partnership agreement is annexed 
with Quantitative Analysis Study. The study applied the Computational General 
Equilibrium to estimate the economic effects of trade liberalization between Japan and 
Thailand.  
56 Agency France Press. Japan-Thailand trade pact takes effect, published on November 
02, 2007. However, the factual presentation of the agreement by the Committee on 
Regional Trade Agreement to be released in the future is needed to confirm this claim. 
57 Article 18 and Annex 1 to Article 18 of JTEPA  
58 Article 20, 21, and 22 of JTEPA 
59  Article 28.2 of JTEPA: Live animals, agricultural and fishery products, natural 
substances, raw materials, waste and scrap, produced, extracted or consumed in the 
exporting party, and products made thereof. 
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have the maximum value or weight of no more than 7% for chapter 19 through 24, and 
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61 Article 27, 28, 29, and 32 of JTEPA 
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63 Article 75, 79, 80, 93, 96, and 103 of JTEPA 
64 Annex 2 to chapter 9 of JTEPA: Specific commitment for the movement of natural 
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65 Japan imported agricultural products of about 11.3% of her total imports in 2006. This 
figure is quoted from trade profile statistics from the World Trade Organization’s website. 
66 Siriporn Sachamuneewongse, in Trade deal: An opportunity and challenge, presented 
the table of tariff concession. The MFN tariff for automobile with engine of over 3,000 cc 
was 80% and it is reduced to 60% and will remain constant in four years until 
renegotiation. 
67 The task force report on Japan-Thailand economic partnership agreement 
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suppliers qualified under Japanese law”, instructors, and those engaging in business 
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69 According to statistical data of World Trade Organization USA, Japan and EU three 
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70 Thailand’s Individual Action Plan 2008, APEC  
71 Thailand’s Individual Action Plan 2008, APEC and WTO webpage 
72 World Investment Report 2006 page 120 
73 Thailand Country Brief - September 2008 political review by Australian ministry of 
foreign affair and trade 
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75 Economic and Social Survey of the Asia and the Pacific 2008 page 100 
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